





Reexamination of Executive Compensation with an Emphasis  
on the Effects of Employee Stock Option Costs  






























Reexamination of Executive Compensation with an Emphasis  
on the Effects of Employee Stock Option Costs  



















A THESIS SUBMITTED 
FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE 
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING 






I sincerely believe that without the help from numerous people who have constantly 
supported me throughout my candidature, this thesis would not have been possible. 
I wish to express my deepest appreciation and gratitude to my supervisor, Associate 
Professor, Michael Shih. Without his commitment, warm encouragement and patience, 
I would definitely have found it difficult to complete my thesis. 
The research work herein was greatly facilitated by the Research Scholarship 
provided by National University of Singapore. The excellent environment for research 
provided by the Department of Finance and Accounting of NUS will be appreciated. 
Last, but not least, I wish to express my heartfelt thanks to my parents, my sister and 






This study analyzes the determinants of CEO compensation with an emphasis on the 
effects of employee stock option costs and R&D expenditures. I examine the effects 
of these two items because firm performance as measured by reported accounting 
profits could contain important errors if these two items are not carefully taken into 
account. Moreover, this study may help inform how firms internally view these two 
controversial accounting items.  
I obtain two major results. First, employee stock option costs negatively affect CEO 
cash compensation and total compensation, suggesting that firms treat employee stock 
options as an expense internally. The result is consistent with the findings of Aboody 
et al. (2004) which indicate that investors perceive employee stock options as an 
expense. I also find that R&D expenditures do not significantly affect CEO 
compensation in the current year. The result is consistent with the explanation that 
firms do not regard R&D expenditures as an expense but as an asset.  
CEO cash compensation is mainly determined by firm size, firm performance, the 
CEO’s age, his tenure, and his shareholding. For CEO stock-based compensation, 
firm size, growth opportunities, and previous year’s stock-based compensation of the 
CEO are the determinants. 
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1.1 Background of the Study 
The media have played up the seemingly outrageous compensation for CEOs and the 
general outcries against it (e.g., O’Malley, 2004; Alaganar, 2004). This leads to 
substantial research interest in the relationship between CEO compensation and firm 
performance (Murphy, 1985; Lambert and Larcker, 1987; Chung and Pruitt, 1996; 
Baber et al., 1996; Veliyath, 1999; Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). Empirical results on 
this issue have been mixed, however. Some studies find a positive relationship 
between CEO compensation and firm performance (e.g., Murphy 1985; Chung and 
Pruitt, 1996; Baber et al., 1996; Gaver and Gaver, 1998), while others report that the 
relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance is rather weak (e.g., 
Veliyath, 1999; Perry and Zenner, 2000; Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). More recently, 
Bebchuk and Fried (2004) attribute the high CEO pay in the United States to 
managerial power. 
This study reexamines the relationship between CEO compensation and firm 
performance. To proceed, I break down earnings into several elements and relate CEO 
compensation to each element rather than to total earnings as typically in prior studies. 
I am particularly interested in the effects of the cost of granting stock options to 
employees and R&D expenditures on CEO compensation. The Generally Accepted 
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Accounting Principles (GAAP) in the United States do not require firms to expense 
employee stock option (ESO) costs, and virtually all firms report earnings before ESO 
costs and ESO costs are only disclosed in a footnote. Since employees receive options 
in lieu of cash compensation, ESO costs appear to be as real a labor cost as the cash 
compensation. As argued by Warren Buffett (2001), this treatment substantially 
distorts reported earnings. 
As for R&D expenditures, the prevailing practice is to treat them as an expense on the 
income statement, thus reducing reported earnings. R&D expenditures, however, 
provide future benefits in many cases, especially for those firms that experience fast 
advances in technology and compete on the basis of innovation. Many authors, 
including Stewart (1991), therefore argue that these expenditures should be treated as 
an investment/asset instead. 
1.2 Objectives of the Study 
By relating CEO compensation to various elements of reported earnings, rather than 
to total reported earnings, this study aims to advance knowledge on the relationship 
between CEO compensation and firm performance. Since different elements of 
earnings may be given different multiples by financial markets, it is possible that, 
when determining CEO compensation, compensation committees take these elements 
into consideration in different ways and to different extents. The test results of this 
study will shed light on this question. 
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My test results will also shed light on how firms view ESO costs and R&D 
expenditures. Against the backdrop of analysts and academic researchers who wonder 
about how these items should be treated in financial statements, it would be useful to 
find out where firms themselves stand on the issue. While my results may not provide 
the final and definitive answer on how firms view these items, the empirical 
relationships between CEO compensation and these items hint at these items in the 
eyes of firms themselves. The study therefore provides valuable input in the debate on 
how ESO costs and R&D expenditures should be treated in financial statements. 
1.3 Methodology of the Study 
Employing annual cross-sectional regressions, I investigate the relationships between 
CEO compensation and various elements of reported earnings, as well as 
market-based and other measures of performance for a sample of U.S. listed firms 
over the 1998 - 2000 interval. ESO costs and R&D expenditures are entered into the 
regressions as two independent variables, so their effects on annual CEO 
compensation can be assessed after other earnings elements and market-based and 
other measures of firm performance are controlled for. 
Several measures of CEO compensation are used in this study: Cash compensation, 
stock-based compensation, and total compensation. The relationships between each 
compensation measure and earnings elements in each year are examined individually. 
Similar to many other researchers (e.g., Gaver and Gaver, 1993; Chung and Pruitt, 
1996; Bryan et al., 2000; Ryan and Wiggins, 2001), I also include firm size, 
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price-to-book ratio, past sales growth, CEO age, CEO tenure and CEO shareholdings 
as control variables in the cross-sectional annual regressions. Moreover, I use both the 
level and change specifications in the cross-sectional regressions. In the level 
specification, variables are entered into the regressions as the levels measured in each 
year. In the change specification, they are entered as changes from the previous year.   
1.4 Findings and Potential Contributions of the Study 
The empirical results vary somewhat across model specifications and years. But I 
obtain two major results in most regressions. First, CEO compensation is negatively 
correlated with ESO costs. The result is robust across the three measures of CEO 
compensation and across the sampling years (1998-2000). The results suggest that 
ESO costs are not considered by the board’s compensation committee to be a costless 
form of compensation to employees. While the results do not necessarily mean the 
firms regard ESO costs as an expense, they do add to the body evidence in the popular 
and academic literature that firms view them in that way. 
Second, CEO compensation is unrelated to R&D expenditures. This result is also 
robust to the measure of CEO compensation and the sampling years. While open to 
more than one interpretation, the results strengthen the argument that R&D 
expenditures provide benefits in the future and are more like an investment than an 
expense. I conclude that firms are better able to quantify the future benefits of their 
R&D expenditures than are the general public and external users of financial 
statements. Thus, while policy makers espouse treating R&D expenditures as an 
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expense as a result of the difficulty of assigning a value to future benefits from such 
expenditures, firms treat R&D expenses more like an investment than an expense. 
1.5 Organization of the Thesis 
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 reviews empirical 
research on the factors affecting executive compensation. An overview of the 
accounting treatments for stock options and R&D expenditures as well as the 
controversy surrounding them is also presented. In Chapter 3, the model for this study 
is developed and possible results are predicted. The research methodology, the data 
sources, and the sample selection procedures are outlined in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 
analyzes the results. Chapter 6 summarizes the major findings of this study, and 
discusses the limitations and suggestions for future research. 
 





2.1 Overview  
This chapter reviews the literature investigating the determinants of CEO 
compensation. Since this study emphasizes the effects of employee stock options and 
R&D expenditures on CEO compensation, a review of the literature on employee 
stock options and R&D expenditures is also given. 
2.2 CEO Compensation and the Determinants 
This section introduces the components of CEO compensation and reviews the prior 
research on the various determinants of CEO compensation. 
2.2.1 CEO Compensation 
In a public firm, control rights are vested with the directors who in turn authorize the 
exercise of control rights to the CEO and other top executive officers. The 
compensation package of a CEO is normally determined by the compensation 
committee of the firm, a committee of the board of directors. The compensation 
committee develops a compensation policy that enables the firm to attract and retain 
the CEO and other top executives. A compensation package is also used to motivate 
the CEO and other top executives towards meeting the goals of the firm and its 
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shareholders. As Reiter (2003) points out, one major duty of a typical compensation 
committee is CEO management. It includes establishing, monitoring, reviewing 
performance guidelines for the CEO and guidance for the development of corporate 
strategy, assisting the board in assessing and evaluating the CEO’s performance, and 
recommending the CEO’s compensation, including salary, incentives, benefits and 
other perquisites. The overall purpose of the compensation committee is to establish 
an effective compensation program that will support and reinforce the long-term 
corporate goals (Kauss, 2003). In other words, the committee should have direct 
responsibility for the review and approval of the CEO’s compensation and benefits. It 
should also provide a framework for maintaining the overall compensation program. 
A CEO’s total compensation package consists of three components: (1) salary, (2) 
benefits (principally pension benefits, health benefits and perquisites of various types), 
and (3) incentive compensation. The first two components are relatively fixed, and the 
last component is usually related to the corporate or individual performance. Although 
the three components are interdependent, incentive compensation is specifically 
related to the management control function and is an important indicator of how the 
compensation committee assesses the CEO’s performance. 
Incentive compensation plans can be divided into short-term incentive plans which 
are based on the CEO’s performance in the current year, and long-term incentive 
plans which relate the CEO’s compensation to his1 long-term accomplishments. For 
                                                        
1 For the sake of simplicity, I use the masculine gender when referring to the CEO or executive. This is done 
without any biasness on my part. 
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example, a cash bonus is usually associated with shot-term incentive while stocks 
options and other forms of stock-based payments tend to be associated with long-term 
incentive. 
The distribution of CEO compensation components is changing over the time. Much 
of the early research on CEO compensation has focused on the cash components 
(which is defined as base salary plus annual bonus) of total compensation because 
cash compensation represents a material portion of a CEO’s yearly compensation and 
dominates other forms of compensation during the periods studied (Murphy, 1985; 
Lambert and Larcker, 1987). However, the stock-based portion of total compensation 
has increased significantly in recent years. For some firms, it makes up about 
one-third of executives’ total compensation (Anderson et al., 1999). Therefore, stock 
options have gained more attention in CEO compensation research (Baber et al., 1996; 
Veliyath, 1999). 
2.2.2 Determinants of CEO Compensation 
There is much research on the determinants of executive compensation. One 
important topic in the literature is how CEO compensation is related to firm 
performance. However, in spite of intense research, inconsistent results on the 
strength of the pay-performance link remain. In this section, I review the determinants 
of CEO compensation investigated by prior researches and the inconsistent results of 
the relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance.  
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Firm Performance: Arguments For the Pay-Performance Link   
Forbes magazine publishes a list of the compensation of hundreds of CEOs every 
year and compares their compensation levels with the firm profits for which they are 
presumably responsible. The general message is that CEO compensation is related to 
firm performance. Accounting researchers have also investigated the information 
properties of market and accounting performance measures in the context of executive 
performance evaluation. Antle and Smith (1986) investigate the relationship between 
executive compensation and firm-specific fluctuations in performance. They find that 
relative firm performance evaluation is used for executive compensation to remove 
noise in performance measures. Lambert and Larcker (1987) use accounting return on 
equity and security market return as performance measures and document a positive 
relationship between the cash compensation of CEOs and the firms’ contemporaneous 
earnings performance.  
The evidence from prior studies indicates that firm performance, measured by equity 
returns and accounting earnings, provides insights into a CEO’s unobservable actions 
in the context of agency theory. However, the explanatory power of earnings and 
market returns may be different, even though there is little agreement on their 
respective roles. Sloan (1993) provides evidence that earnings-based incentives help 
shield executives from fluctuations in the firm’s value that are caused by market-wide 
factors beyond their control. He demonstrates that earnings reflect firm-specific 
changes in value, but are less sensitive to market-wide movements in equity value. In 
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contrast, Bushman et al. (2002) provide evidence of an average decline in the 
importance of earnings in determining the cash compensation of CEOs relative to 
stock returns during their sample period (1971-1995). Specifically, they find a 
significant increase in the coefficient for stock returns in compensation models which 
include both stock returns and earnings, a significant decline in the ratio of the 
coefficient for earnings to the coefficient for stock returns, and a significant increase 
in the incremental R² of stock returns over and above earnings without a 
corresponding increase in the incremental R² of earnings over and above stock 
returns. 
With the recent increase in the use of stock-based compensation, more studies have 
examined the relationship between different components of compensation and firm 
performance measures. For example, Murphy (1985) finds significant positive 
relationships between the change in total compensation and stock returns and also 
between the change in cash compensation and stock returns. However, he finds no 
relationship between the change in stock-based compensation and stock returns. 
Baber et al. (1996) find that market return is positively related to executives’ total 
compensation, cash compensation (salary and bonus), and long-term compensation 
(option, restricted stock and long-term incentive plan pay-out). However, accounting 
return has a positive relationship with cash compensation only.  
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The Effects of Cash Flows and Accruals 
As an accounting-based performance measure, earnings comprise two components: 
cash flows and accruals. Many studies have investigated how the principal 
components of earnings affect executive compensation. 
Clinch and Magliolo (1993) examine the possibility that various components of 
earnings relate differently to CEO performance and thus do not have the same effect 
on CEO compensation. They divided earnings into three components: earnings from 
recurrent operating activities, discretionary non-operating earnings that have direct 
cash flow implications, and discretionary accounting earnings that have no cash flow 
consequences. They find that both earnings from recurrent operating activities and 
cash-flow-related non-operating earnings are related to CEO cash compensation. In 
contrast, discretionary accounting earnings not accompanied by cash flows do not 
have statistically significant association with cash compensation. This is consistent 
with the argument that discretion reduces the effectiveness of accounting-related 
measures as performance measures. As Firth et al. (1999) point out, accounting 
numbers can be “managed” or “manipulated” via changing accounting methods and 
can be subject to falsification by the management. Among the components of 
accounting earnings, accruals are easier to be “managed” than cash flows and may be 
less reliable in measuring performance. 
Natarajan (1996) also investigates the role of different components of earnings in 
CEO compensation contracts. He argues that shareholders will use components of 
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earnings as additional performance measures whenever the components provide 
information about managerial decisions. His results indicate that earnings and cash 
flow measures together have a better association with cash compensation paid to 
CEOs of U.S. companies than aggregate earnings alone. The evidence suggests that 
current accruals and cash flows from operations are aggregated for performance 
evaluation. 
In addition, Gaver and Gaver (1998) investigate the role of alternative earnings 
components in CEO cash compensation functions. They find that cash compensation 
has a significantly positive relationship to earnings from continued operations, as long 
as the earnings are positive. They also find that profits from non-recurring 
transactions affect CEO compensation, while non-recurring losses do not. In other 
words, when compensation committees determine CEO compensation, they 
distinguish between the continued operations and the non-recurring transactions that 
comprise the net income. 
Arguments Against the Pay-Performance Link  
Although intense research has found some links between CEO compensation and firm 
performance (accounting or market performance), inconsistent results on the strength 
of the pay-performance link arise recently. Moreover, there is ongoing criticism on 
the increasingly high incomes of CEO. For example, Paul Hodgson (2004), a senior 
researcher at The Corporate Library, comments in a report that “in the vast majority 
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 13
of U.S. companies, the pay-performance link is not only broken, it was never forged 
in the first place” (p. 3). 
Veliyath (1999) examines the relationship between the compensation of CEOs & 
COOs and market return performance using a sample of U.S. pharmaceutical firms. 
His study shows that market return does not have an influence on the levels of both 
cash compensation and stock options for CEOs and COOs.  
Perry and Zenner (2000) argue that CEOs receive excessive compensation in the 
1990s because they retain extensive control in the relationship with the board of 
directors. They provide evidence that the large increases in CEO pay are unrelated to 
firm performance. Also, while poor firm performance may lead to lower CEO 
compensation, the reduction in pay is negligible in most cases.  
Similarly, Bebchuk and Fried (2004) argue that the executive compensation is linked 
only tenuously to managerial performance. They demonstrate that salary and bonus 
payments are not correlated with managerial performance in the 1990s. Also, stock 
option plans bring managers substantial gains that are not due to their own 
performance. They regard these as the evidence of managerial power. That is, 
managers with more power get more payments and have compensation packages that 
are less sensitive to performance.  
Firm Size 
Firm size can be measured by the book value of total assets (Chung and Pruitt, 1996; 
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Veliyath, 1999). Many studies have reported a strong positive link between firm size 
and managerial rewards (Roberts, 1956; Ciscel and Carroll, 1980; Agarwal, 1981). 
That is, the CEO of a larger firm may receive more compensation.  
There are at least two theoretical explanations for the positive correlation between 
firm size and executive compensation. First, the top position (i.e., CEO) could be 
regarded by lower level managers as spoils that go to the winner of an intra-firm 
tournament (Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983; Rosen, 1992). A larger firm represents a 
larger tournament, and therefore the winner deserves a higher prize. Second, 
managing a bigger firm may involve more skills and job complexity than managing a 
smaller firm (Chung and Pruitt, 1996; Veliyath, 1999). Compensation is used to solve 
the adverse selection problem in choosing a competent manager. Both of the 
explanations imply that better managers would be able to control bigger firms. 
Does the positive relationship between firm size and CEO compensation imply that 
making a firm larger would increase the compensation of an existing CEO? Since 
merger is a quick way to increase size, is a CEO motivated to engage in a potentially 
value-reducing merger to increase his compensation? To answer these questions, Bliss 
and Rosen (2001) analyze the relationship between CEO compensation and mergers. 
They find that CEO compensation generally increases after mergers even if the 
mergers cause the acquirers’ stock price to decline. In other words, merger is an easy 
way to rapidly increase the overall wealth of the CEO, even though it could be at the 
expense of shareholders. Moreover, they find that a CEO with a greater percentage of 
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stock-based compensation relative to cash compensation is less likely to make 
acquisitions. This is consistent with the argument that CEOs respond to incentives and 
make fewer wealth-reducing mergers when they have more shareholding.  
CEO Age 
CEO age may affect his remuneration as it functions as a proxy variable for his level 
of training and experience. However, the relationship may vary across the 
components of CEO compensation. 
Bryan et al. (2000) find a negative relationship between a CEO’s age and his stock 
option holding. One plausible explanation is that older CEOs facing imminent 
retirement prefer to minimize the uncontrollable effects of the market-wide factors on 
their wealth. Another explanation is that younger CEOs are often found in new and 
high-growth firms that tend to rely heavily on stock option awards.  
Ryan and Wiggins (2001) find a concave relationship between cash bonus and CEO 
age, suggesting that firms pay the youngest and oldest managers less short-term bonus. 
They also find a negative linear relationship between options and age, but a concave 
relationship between restricted stock and age. 
In contrast, Chung and Pruitt (1996) cannot find any evidence to support the 
hypothesis that age, as a proxy variable for general training or experience, affects 
executive compensation. They explain that executive positions are characteristically 
different from other jobs. The experience from non-managerial jobs may not be an 
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asset in improving a CEO’s performance. Therefore, the positive relationship between 
age and employee compensation does not apply to the executive labor market. 
CEO Tenure 
A CEO’s tenure is the number of years the CEO is in the position. Prior research has 
produced mixed results on the relationship between CEO compensation and the 
CEO’s tenure. 
Chung and Pruitt (1996) find that CEO tenure has a significantly positive relationship 
with executive stockholding. This is consistent with the view that executives with 
longer employment histories can accumulate more stock options as incentive 
compensation. Also, longer tenure is associated with more experience, which leads to 
greater compensation in the form of stock options. In contrast, Ryan and Wiggins 
(2001) find that CEO tenure is negatively related to stock options at the 10% 
significance level. The CEOs with longer tenures prefer immediate benefits and 
therefore require less equity-based compensation than newer CEOs. 
CEO Ownership  
Most studies find that a CEO’s compensation is negatively related to his ownership, 
which is usually measured by the percentage of the firm’s shares held by the CEO. 
Bryan et al. (2000) note a significantly negative relationship between CEO 
shareholding and his stock option awards. Ryan and Wiggins (2001) find that CEO 
stock ownership has a negative relationship with all forms of incentive compensation. 
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This finding is consistent with the notion that if a CEO holds a large portion of his 
firm’s shares, his interests will become more aligned with the shareholders’ interests. 
Hence, the CEO may have less demand for further stock-based compensation (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). It is also possible that CEOs are typically unable to diversify the 
risk associated with their wealth (Smith and Watts, 1992). This constraint affects their 
tolerance for additional risk and they may therefore prefer cash compensation to stock 
options.  
Firm Growth Opportunities 
Many studies have documented that high-growth firms are more likely than 
low-growth firms to use stock-based compensation instead of salary and bonus 
compensation in the compensation packages of their senior executives (Lewellen et al., 
1987; Clinch, 1991; Smith and Watts, 1992; Gaver and Gaver, 1993). Gaver and 
Gaver (1995) use market-to-book assets, market-to-book equity, R&D expense to 
assets, and total return variance to measure investment opportunities. They find that 
firms with abundant investment opportunities pay higher amounts of total 
compensation to their executives. Moreover, executives of growth firms receive a 
larger portion of their compensation from long-term incentive compensation, such as 
performance awards, restricted stock grants, and stock option grants. On the other 
hand, executives of non-growth firms receive a larger portion of their compensation 
from a fixed salary. They explain that higher manager-shareholder information 
asymmetry in growth firms leads these firms to emphasize long-term incentive 
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compensation in order to motivate managers to act in their shareholders’ interests and 
reduce agency costs. 
Industry Membership 
Industry membership may have a considerable effect on CEO compensation in two 
respects. First, some industries, such as high-growth industries, may have a special 
demand on CEOs, which affects the composition of CEO compensation. Smith and 
Watts (1992) examine industry-level data and find that it is more common for 
high-growth industries than for low-growth industries to use stock-based 
compensation plans. Ryan and Wiggins (2002) explain that high-growth industries, 
such as the biotechnology, computer, high-tech and software industries are 
characterized by higher uncertainty, which calls for greater use of options to 
encourage risk-averse managers to undertake risky investments. 
Second, the industry membership may indirectly affect the CEO compensation 
through other variables. Ely (1991) finds that the industry-specific characteristics lead 
to relative weights placed on accounting measures associated with executive 
compensation. In the oil industry, for example, the discovery of oil reserves is a key 
factor related to executive performance. However, the discovery of natural resources 
may not be reflected in accounting earnings, but in market returns. Ely (1991) also 
finds that the choice between alternative accounting measures varies from industry to 
industry and the difference from these measures will affect the determination of CEO 
compensation. The relevant accounting measures include inventories, plant and 
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equipment, and interest-bearing liabilities. These measures are tailored to reflect 
industry-specific production technologies, markets, and regulatory environments. 
As seen from the above literature review, previous researchers have investigated the 
relationships of CEO compensation with firm performance and firm-specific variables. 
However, the effects of employee stock option costs and R&D expenditures are 
largely ignored by prior research. The purpose of this study is to advance knowledge 
on the determinants of CEO compensation and shed light on how firms view 
employee stock option costs and R&D expenditures. To appreciate the channels 
through which these two items affect CEO compensation, it is necessary to 
understand the accounting standards of these items and the conflicting views 
regarding the standards. Therefore, in the subsequent sections, I review the accounting 
standards of employee stock options and R&D expenditures, and the ongoing debate 
over these accounting standards.  
2.3 Employee Stock Options  
An employee stock option is a contract that gives an employee the right, but not the 
obligation, to buy a certain number of shares of stock on or before a given date in the 
future (known as the expiration date) at a price agreed upon at the time the option is 
granted (known as the exercise or strike price).  
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2.3.1 The Use of Employee Stock Options 
There are two prevalent hypotheses on the reasons for using stock options as a form 
of compensation. First, the incentive alignment hypothesis assumes that stock option 
plans can align managers’ interests with the long-term interests of the firm and its 
shareholders. Given that agency problems2 exist, the shareholders’ concern is to 
devise an appropriate incentive and monitoring system that induces the manager to act 
according to their desire (Starks, 1987). Stock options can align the interests of 
executives with those of shareholders, as executives who hold options will personally 
benefit from a rise in the share price. Second, the employee retention hypothesis 
argues that stock options can discourage employees from leaving because stock 
options have vesting periods. During the vesting period of an employee stock option 
plan, the employee does not own the shares unconditionally. For example, if an 
employee resigns before this period ends, his stock options may expire and he will 
lose the options. To attract and retain talent, firms may use stock options as a primary 
compensation tool (Zhang, 2002). 
Besides the two hypotheses, there are other benefits from issuing employee stock 
options. First, stock option programs appear to increase productivity and return on 
assets (Kruse et al., 2000). Second, financial markets understand the incentive that 
                                                        
2 Jensen and Meckling (1976) define an agency relationship as a contract under which shareholders (the principals) 
engage a manager (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision 
making authority to the agent. The separation of ownership and control in corporations produces a condition where 
the interests of the owner and that of the ultimate manager might and often diverge (Berle and Means, 1932). As 
the managers would not always act in the interests of the shareholders, agency costs arise. Another source of 
agency cost might come from the divergence in risk preference between managers and shareholders. Given the 
decreasing utility for wealth and the large amount of agent capital that is dependent on the company, managers are 
assumed to be risk averse. On the other hand, owners can easily diversify away risk and are risk neutral. 
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stock options provide to employees, and react positively when firms issue stock 
options. As Malkiel and Baumol (2002) have found, stock prices generally benefit 
from the issue of employee stock options. Finally, issuing stock options can preserve 
cash and is especially attractive to start-ups that have limited cash resources (Plishner, 
1993; Malkiel and Baumol, 2002). 
Given the above benefits, employee stock options have been widely used, especially 
by newly established firms. Tice (1999) reports that in 1989, the total number of stock 
options outstanding was equal to 7% of the total number of shares outstanding for the 
200 largest firms in the United States. By 1998, the total number of stock options 
outstanding accounted for 13.2 % of the total number of shares outstanding for all U.S. 
listed firms. The percentages were much higher for firms in the securities and 
high-technology industries. In recent years, stock options continue to be used 
extensively. According to the report “The State of Employee Stock Options: A 
WorldatWork Hot Topic Survey” (2002), an electronic survey conducted jointly by 
WorldatWork3 and Sibson Consulting (a division of The Segal Company), the goals 
of stock options in 2002 are the same as they were in 2000. Among nearly 300 
companies that responded to the survey, most of them still use option programs to 
attract and retain talent, motivate individual performance, focus employee attention on 
organizational performance, and create a culture of ownership. It seems that from 
2000 to 2002, there was little change in terms of the specific groups of employees that 
                                                        
3 WorldatWork is a not-for-profit professional association dedicated to knowledge leadership in compensation, 
benefits and total rewards. 
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are eligible for options, the percentage of the employees eligible for options, and the 
value of options in the overall compensation package. 
However, some researchers have questioned the effectiveness of using stock options 
to compensate employees. For example, Tice (1999) argues that shareholders will 
ultimately suffer from issuing stock options. First, issuing new shares of stock to 
satisfy option obligations tends to reduce earnings per share when measured on a 
“fully diluted basis” for the new issue, therefore diluting existing shareholders’ wealth. 
Second, corporate management is tempted to buy back large amounts of stocks with 
cash to disguise the large number of additional shares issued for stock options. 
Shareholders should question whether this is a good use of corporate cash flows. 
Third, under the current accounting treatment, the use of employee stock options over 
other forms of compensation may cause a firm’s earnings to be overstated. 
2.3.2 Accounting for Employee Stock Options 
The debate on the accounting treatment for employee stock options started in the early 
1990s and continues till today. This section reviews the development of the U.S. 
accounting standard for stock options. The international and U.K. accounting 
standards for stock options are also reviewed. 
APB 25 
The earliest accounting standard for stock options was the U.S. Accounting Principles 
Board Opinion No. 25 (APB 25) “Accounting for Stock Issued to Employees”, 
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published in October 1972. APB 25 dictates that the compensation cost for fixed stock 
option plans4 is measured at the grant date when both the number of shares an 
employee is entitled to receive and the option or purchase price are known. The 
amount of compensation cost is equal to the option’s “intrinsic value”, that is, the 
excess of the fair market value of the stock over the amount required to be paid for the 
option. This compensation cost is generally recognized proportionally over the 
vesting period, and is reversed only if the stock option is forfeited because the 
employee fails to fulfill his obligations. Under APB 25 (the intrinsic-value based 
method), the compensation cost of stock options should only be recognized if the 
quoted market price of the stock at the grant date is greater than the amount the 
grantee must pay to acquire the stock.  
SFAS 123 
As employee stock options became more popular as a means of compensation, 
accounting professionals and accounting regulators became concerned about the 
inadequacy of APB 25. In 1993, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 
of the United States proposed recognition of compensation cost for all awards of stock 
options, based on their fair value at the grant date. The response to the proposal was 
overwhelmingly negative. Firms argued that the available models for estimating the 
fair value of stock options require the use of highly subjective assumptions, which can 
                                                        
4 Fixed options are stock options for which both the number of shares and the option or purchase price (if any) are 
fixed on the date of grant. Variable options (or “performance options”) are stock options for which either the 
number of shares or the option or purchase price (if any) is dependent on future events (other than continued 
service). In the case of performance options and other variable plans, APB 25 dictates that a charge is measured at 
the difference between the market price and exercise price of the share at measurement date when the number and 
the exercise price of options become fixed. As this measurement date is likely to be much later than grant date, any 
charge is subject to uncertainty and would be large if the share price is increasing. 
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materially affect the fair value estimates. High-technology firms and start-up firms 
argued that the recognition of stock option expense would place them at a competitive 
disadvantage. Under pressure from firms and the accounting profession, the FASB 
withdrew the proposal and decided to “encourage”, but not require, a recognition of 
compensation cost for all stock-based employee compensation, based on fair-value 
methods.  
In October 1995, the FASB issued the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 
No. 123 (SFAS 123), “Accounting for Stock-Based Compensation”, which is 
effective today in the United States. SFAS 123 requires that all products and services 
received in exchange for issuing equity securities are valued at the fair value of the 
securities issued. It also specifies option pricing models to estimate the fair value of a 
stock option granted by a public firm, that is, the Black-Scholes model5 or a binomial 
model6. The Black-Scholes model takes into account the grant date, the exercise price, 
the expected life of the option, the current price of the underlying stock, its expected 
volatility, expected dividends on the stock and the risk-free interest rate for the 
expected term of the option. According to SFAS 123, the compensation cost for 
employee stock options should be recognized by a charge to compensation over the 
period from the grant date to the date that the award is vested. SFAS 123 also dictates 
                                                        
5 The Black-Scholes model is developed by Fischer Black and Myron Scholes in 1973. The model is the basic 
instrument for determining a stock option’s estimated value at grant. The model is based on the following 
assumptions: the price of the underlier is lognormally distributed with constant mean and volatility; there are no 
transaction costs or taxes; markets trade continuously; the risk-free rate is constant and the same for all maturities. 
6 The binomial model breaks down the time to expiration into a very large number of time intervals, or steps.  A 
tree of stock prices is initially produced working forward from the present to expiration.  At each step it is 
assumed that the stock price will move up or down by an amount calculated using volatility and time to 
expiration. This produces a binomial distribution, or a recombining tree, of underlying stock prices. The tree 
represents all the possible paths that the stock price could take during the life of the option. At the end of the tree – 
ie at expiration of the option – all the terminal option prices for each of the final possible stock prices are simply 
equal their intrinsic values. 
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that previously recognized compensation cost shall not be reversed if a vested 
employee stock option expires unexercised.  
However, SFAS 123 allows a firm to continue to measure compensation costs for 
employee stock options using the intrinsic value based method prescribed by APB 25. 
If a firm continues to apply APB 25 for its stock options, it shall disclose the pro 
forma net income in the notes of the income statement. The pro forma net income is 
calculated by using the fair value based accounting method suggested in SFAS 123. In 
summary, firms can choose either the fair-value based method or the intrinsic value 
based method to account for employee stock options. 
International and U.K. Accounting Standards 
There was no international accounting standard covering the recognition or 
measurement of stock-based compensation until February 2004, when the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB)7 issued the International Financial 
Reporting Standard 2 (IFRS 2), “Share-based Payment”. IFRS 2 requires that, with 
effect from 1st January 2005, a firm should recognize all stock-based compensation as 
an expense in its profit and loss account at the grant date. The expense should be 
measured at the fair value of the stock options but no particular pricing model is 
specified for use. 
                                                        
7  The predecessor of International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) was the International Accounting 
Standards Committee (IASC, 1973-2001). The IASC was formed by an agreement of accounting organizations in 
nine countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada etc. The purpose of the committee is 
to formulate uniform international accounting standards and to promote the acceptance of these standards 
worldwide.  
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In the United Kingdom, most firms do not recognize any cost when they grant stock 
options to employees. The reason for this is the absence of any coherent set of rules 
governing the recognition of such cost. After the IASB issued IFRS 2, the Accounting 
Standards Board (ASB) announced its intention to issue an accounting standard on 
stock option schemes and other stock-based compensation before 20058. The new 
standard will be based on IFRS 2 and will apply to all U.K. listed firms. 
2.3.3 Accounting Practice for Employee Stock Options by U.S. Firms 
Prior to the issuance of SFAS 123, the accounting practice for employee stock options 
was governed by APB 25 (the intrinsic-value based method). Since many companies 
issue stock options with an exercise price greater than or equal to the current market 
price (Grey, Cotter and Barnes, 2002), they do not recognize any compensation cost 
associated with their grants of stock options under APB 25. 
Even though SFAS 123 has been taken effect, firms do not have to deduct stock 
option costs as compensation costs against profits. Instead, the costs of such option 
grants – as calculated using fair-value pricing models – only need to be disclosed in 
the footnotes of the firms’ annual financial reports under SFAS 123. With this 
alternative, very few firms voluntarily adopt the fair-value method and recognize 
stock option costs as an expense since this method reduces current profit. By the end 
of the year 2001, only two of the S&P 500 firms expense employee stock options in 
their statements (Fox, 2002). Generally, most firms continue to account for employee 
                                                        
8 See the Press Notice on 19 February 2004 on http://www.asb.org.uk. 
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stock-based compensation using the intrinsic value method of accounting under APB 
25 with disclosure of pro forma net income in the footnotes.  
2.3.4 Controversy over the Accounting Treatment of Employee Stock Options 
The controversy surrounding stock-based compensation centers largely on whether 
this item should be recognized as an expense in the profit and loss account, and the 
basis of measurement.  
Arguments For Expensing Stock Options 
Those who support expensing of stock options argue that employee stock options are 
valuable for employees and represent a cost to employers. As one of the strongest 
proponents, Warren Buffett (2001), points out, “If options aren’t a form of 
compensation, what are they? If compensation isn’t an expense, what is it? And, if 
expenses shouldn’t go into the calculation of earnings, where in the world should they 
go?” (p. 199) 
Similarly, Quinn (2002) notes that when a stock option is exercised, the cash received 
is similar to any personal or firm-based performance bonus. In other words, employee 
stock options give rise to compensation cost just like all other forms of compensation, 
such as salaries and bonuses. The accounting method for employee stock options 
should be consistent with those used for salaries and bonuses. Quinn further suggests 
that options would benefit corporations in the long run if they are accounted for 
appropriately. If employee stock options are “costless”, firms would tend to use stock 
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options indiscriminately. Expensing the employee stock options would help to curb 
the abuse of options.  
Aboody et al. (2004) find a negative relationship between share price and stock-based 
compensation expense, indicating that investors view stock-based compensation 
expense as an expense of the firm and measure the expense with sufficient reliability 
in their valuation. This finding thus questions the quality of reported earnings under 
SFAS 123 that does not recognize stock-based compensation expense. 
Arguments Against Expensing Stock Options 
Opponents of expensing stock options mainly question the objectivity of fair-value 
based methods. Malkiel and Baumol (2002) recommend that the income statement of 
a firm should reflect the “expense” measured by the cash-equivalent value of the 
options. However, there is no clear and objective method to calculate the value of 
options with reasonable accuracy at the time they are issued. Even the well-accepted 
Black-Scholes formula does not provide reliable estimates of options for the 
following two reasons. First, the Black-Scholes formula is typically used for 
short-term and traded options’ pricing. Employee stock options, however, are quite 
different in several aspects: they usually have durations of five to ten years before the 
expiry date; they are contingent on continued employment of the employee; and they 
are subject to various restrictions and are not transferable. Second, some variables in 
the Black-Scholes formula are difficult to be estimated accurately. It is virtually 
impossible to derive a precise estimate of the option’s value, that is, the “cost”.  
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As for the effect of employee stock options on a firm’s earnings, Malkiel and Baumol 
(2002) argue that stock options should be considered as a redistribution of benefits 
between initial stockholders and new stockholders. This redistribution does not reduce 
the overall size of a firm’s total earnings, and is clearly different from the effect of 
cash compensation. 
2.3.5 The Impact of Expensing Employee Stock Options on Corporate Profits 
Under SFAS 123, firms can avoid a charge against income for their employee stock 
options by issuing stock options with an exercise price that is equal or above the 
current share price. If firms charge the “expense” of stock options against reported 
earnings, corporate profits may turn into losses, especially for many high-technology 
firms. MacDonald and McGough (1999) pointed out that if Wall Street had started 
paying more attention to the cost of options in the late 1990s, the stock prices of some 
firms would have been under serious pressure.  
Various studies have shown the extent to which the current accounting treatment of 
options has inflated the profits of the company. For example, Bear Stearns & Co. 
studied the effect of options on 1997 earnings for 30 stocks in the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average and the 56 high-tech companies in the technology sector of the 
Standard & Poor’s 500-stock index. The study shows that treating options as expenses 
would have cut earnings of the firms in 1997 by an average of 10%. The net income 
of high-technology firms would have been reduced by 10% to 100% because these 
firms tend to rely heavily on large option grants to attract talent. The firms in the Dow 
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Jones Industrial Average would experience the least impact, with earnings reduced by 
an average 3%. This is because the Dow 30’s earnings are enormous and many of 
them do not have large option programs (MacDonald, 1998). MacDonald and 
McGough (1999) have also found that if some large-capitalization banks had fully 
accounted for their stock options against their 1998 earnings, their profits would have 
been reduced by 5% to 10%. The rates for mid-capitalization banks are even higher. 
Given these facts, it is not surprising that the requirement to recognize employee stock 
options as an expense is likely to reduce the use of stock options (Grey et al., 2002). 
Particularly, high-technology firms would actively object to recognizing employee 
stock options as an expense. These firms benefit most from stock options because of 
their volatile share prices and low revenues. Even for firms that do not have such 
unfavorable characteristics, expensing employee stock options may reduce their 
reported earnings substantially. 
2.4 Research and Development (R&D) Expenditures 
The definition of research and development (“R&D”) is provided in Financial 
Accounting Standard 2 (FAS 2), “Accounting for Research and Development Costs”. 
According to FAS 2, research is a “planned search or critical investigation aimed at 
the discovery of new knowledge with the hope that such knowledge will be useful in 
developing a new product or service, a new process or technique, or in bringing about 
a significant improvement to an existing product process”. Development is “the 
translation of research findings or other knowledge into a plan or design for a new 
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product or process, or for a significant improvement to an existing product or process 
whether intended for sale or use”9.  
The elements of costs associated with R&D include materials, equipment, facilities, 
personnel, intangibles purchased from others and contract services. R&D costs may 
differ widely by industry. For example, semiconductor and biotechnology firms 
usually have high R&D expenditures because their products evolve rapidly and have a 
high rate of obsolescence. 
2.4.1 The Motivation for R&D Programs 
Firms with the capability to innovate usually generate greater profits (Balkin et al., 
2000). In a high-technology firm, for example, technological innovation capabilities 
can generate profits. The innovation may be a new product or a new technology 
aimed at improving product quality, reducing cost, and increasing production 
efficiency. All of these may come from R&D programs. Therefore, high-technology 
firms continuously incur large expenditures on R&D programs in order to maintain 
their innovation capability against competitors. 
                                                        
9  According to FAS 2, development includes the conceptual formulation, design, and testing of product 
alternatives, construction of prototypes, and operation of pilot plants. It does not include routine or periodic 
alterations to existing products, production lines, manufacturing processes, and other ongoing operations, even 
though those alterations may represent improvements, and it does not include market research or market-testing 
activities. 
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2.4.2 Accounting for R&D Expenditures 
Accounting for R&D expenditures is not consistent internationally. This section 
reviews the accounting treatments for R&D expenditures under U.S., U.K. and 
international accounting standards. 
U.S. Accounting Standards 
The accounting treatment for R&D expenditures has changed significantly over time. 
Initially, the accepted practice was to defer the incurred cost on R&D and recognize it 
as an asset. This practice was based on the argument that the amount of money spent 
on an R&D program might enhance future revenues and profits. Hence, an asset is 
created and the cost should be matched against future revenue brought about by the 
R&D program.  
In the 1950s, there was a debate on whether to expense R&D expenditures as they 
occur or to capitalize them. Some accountants argued that the future benefits of R&D 
programs are uncertain and there is no relationship between R&D expenditures and 
future revenue. Relying on the concept of conservatism, they advocated writing off 
R&D expenditures immediately. In 1974, the FASB stipulated the accounting 
treatment for R&D expenditures in SFAS No. 2, “Accounting for Research and 
Development Costs”. This Statement dictates that all R&D costs shall be charged as 
an expense when incurred. It also requires a company to disclose in its financial 
statements the total amount of R&D costs charged as expense in each period for 
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which an income statement is presented. This is the prevailing rule that most U.S. 
companies currently use. 
For the special case of R&D expenditures on computer software, in 1985, the FASB 
made a slight amendment in SFAS 86, “Accounting for the Costs of Computer 
Software to be Sold, Leased, or Otherwise Marketed”. This statement specifies that 
the costs incurred internally for the creation of a computer software product should be 
charged to expense until technological feasibility10 has been established for the 
product. Thereafter, all software production costs 11  shall be capitalized and 
subsequently reported at the lower of unamortized cost or net realizable value. 
Capitalized costs are amortized based on current and future revenue for each product 
with an annual minimum equal to the straight-line amortization over the remaining 
estimated economic life of the product. This standard changed the predominant 
practice of expensing all the costs of developing and producing a computer software 
product.  
U.K. and International Accounting Standards 
In the United Kingdom, the accounting rule for R&D expenditures is contained in the 
Statement of Standard Accounting Practice 13 (SSAP 13), “Accounting for Research 
and Development”, which took effect in January 1989. It requires that expenditures on 
                                                        
10 Technological feasibility of a computer software product is established upon completion of a detail program 
design or, in its absence, completion of a working model. In detail, it is the time when the enterprise has completed 
all planning, coding, and testing activities that are necessary to establish that the product can be produced to meet 
its design specifications including functions, features and technical performance requirements. 
11 Those costs include coding and testing performed subsequent to establishing technological feasibility. Software 
production costs for computer software that is to be used as an integral part of a product or process shall not be 
capitalized until (a) technological feasibility has been established for the software and (b) all research and 
development activities for the other components of the product or process have been completed. 
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research and development be written off in the current year through the profit and loss 
account. Only in certain strictly defined circumstances, the development expenditures 
can be deferred to the extent that its recovery can reasonably be regarded as assured. 
Such deferred development costs must be amortized in future years. 
The international accounting standard for R&D costs is similar to that used in the 
United Kingdom. IAS 38, “Intangible Assets”, has been effective since 1999 (revised 
in 2004) and covers the accounting treatment for R&D costs. It requires firms to 
charge all research costs to expense. Development costs incurred after the technical 
and commercial feasibility of the asset for sale or use has been established should be 
capitalized.  
2.4.3 Controversy over the Accounting Treatment of R&D Expenditures 
Controversy over the accounting treatment of R&D expenditures still exists. The key 
point is whether R&D expenditures should be considered as an expense or a kind of 
investment, i.e., whether R&D meets the definition of an asset, and, if so, whether the 
information on R&D has relevance for financial statement users. 
Arguments For Expensing R&D Expenditures 
Clem and Jeffrey (2001) are among those who support the FASB’s decision to 
expense R&D expenditures as they are incurred. They provide four reasons to support 
their argument. First, the future benefits of R&D are rarely certain. An investment or 
an asset is expected to provide future benefit to firms but not every R&D project 
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promises to generate benefits, as the results of R&D projects are not always 
predictable. Second, for an item to be recognized as an asset, it must have a relevant 
attribute that is reliably measurable. R&D is difficult to be valued because of its 
long-term horizon and the uncertainty of the intended outcome. As such, widely 
accepted valuation models for R&D have not yet been developed. Third, the useful 
life over which deferred costs might be allocated is usually arbitrary. The allocated 
costs may not match the future revenues of R&D projects. Finally, deferral is not 
consistent with the conservatism concept in accounting. According to the 
conservatism principle, accountants should choose to record an expense when faced 
with uncertainties. 
Regarding the issue that expensing all R&D expenditures immediately will depress 
the profit of the firm, proponents of SFAS 2 argue that capitalization is potentially 
hazardous. The high capitalization at the beginning of R&D projects could turn 
around later and increase amortization expenses. As Khalaf (1992) puts it, if the 
product does not work as well as anticipated, the firm would have to make big 
write-offs or charges against its earnings. 
Arguments Against Expensing R&D Expenditures 
The arguments against the current accounting standard are equally convincing. 
Newman (1988) argues that at the macroeconomic level, the large amount of R&D 
expenditures obviously enhances profits in later years. An asset is created and 
therefore, its cost should be matched against its future revenues. Moreover, if the 
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costs of creating computer software subsequent to establishing technological 
feasibility could be deferred according to SFAS 86, other R&D expenditures should 
be treated in the same way. 
As for the valuation problem, Newman (1988) points out that there may be specific 
situations that justify deferring expenditures on R&D to achieve a proper matching of 
expenses with revenues. For example, the IASB allows development costs to be 
deferred if the development can be demonstrated to generate future economic benefits. 
The factors considered include the technical feasibility of the project and the 
availability of adequate resources to ensure its completion. Many firms in Europe 
follow IAS 38 and treat development costs as intangible assets, capitalizing them and 
then amortizing them over the life of the product.  
Horwitz and Zhao (1997) examine whether the capital market ignores the mandated 
expensing of firms’ R&D and if it makes its own judgments about current and future 
cash flows. They find that cash flow statements that are reconstructed to assume 
different proportions of expensed and capitalized R&D expenditures can result in a 
better association of cash flow variables with security returns than those that adhere to 
the GAAP requirement of expensing all R&D expenditures. In other words, the 
market does regard part of the R&D expenditures as investments, even though these 
expenditures are actually classified as operational expenses under the U.S. GAAP. 
Similarly, Joseph (2001) finds that R&D expenditures provide incremental 
information beyond the information provided by cash flows and accounting accruals 
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in firm valuation. Joseph (2001) also finds that for firms in R&D-intensive industries, 
the treatment of R&D expenditures as an expense reduces the informational use of the 
accounting earnings. These results suggest that the effects of R&D expenditures are 
long-term and the accounting treatment of expensing all R&D expenditures is not 
appropriate. 
In summary, the literature on CEO compensation finds that some firm-specific 
variables affect CEO compensation. However, the empirical results on the strength of 
the pay-performance link are still inconsistent. Moreover, the effects of employee 
stock options and R&D expenditures on CEO compensation have not been adequately 
examined, although these two accounting items could substantially influence the 
reported firm earnings. This study relates CEO compensation to various elements of 
reported earnings with an emphasis on the effects of employee stock options and 
R&D expenditures. It, therefore, advances the knowledge on the determinants of CEO 
compensation. The results in this study may also provide insights into how firms 
internally treat employee stock options and R&D expenditures. In the next chapter, 
the model used for the regression in this study is developed and the predictions about 
the regression coefficients are also given.  






This chapter develops the model used for the regression in this study. The methods 
used to measure the dependent and independent variables and the predictions about 
the regression coefficients are also described in details. 
3.2 Model Development 
This study examines the determinants of CEO compensation with an emphasis on the 
effects of employee stock options and R&D expenditures. The regression model is 
developed as follows: 
Step I. A CEO is responsible for firm performance. Firm performance can thus reflect 
the CEO’s efforts and achievements. Many studies relate CEO compensation to firm 
performance (Lambert and Larcker, 1987; Defeo et al., 1989; Sloan, 1993). Also, the 
CEO’s compensation is affected by such variables as characteristics of the firm and its 
CEO (Chung and Pruitt, 1996; Bryan et al., 2000; Ryan and Wiggins, 2001). 
Therefore, CEO compensation is a function of the CEO’s achievements 
(ACHIEVEMENT) on firm performance and other control variables (OTHERS)12. 
The equation for estimating the CEO compensation (CEOCOMP) takes the following 
form: 
CEOCOMP = β0 + β1*ACHIEVEMENT + β2*OTHERS + ε                       Equation 1 
                                                        
12 The related control variables will be discussed later in this chapter. 
CHAPTER 3 MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
 39
Step II. In previous studies (Lambert and Larcker, 1987; Baber et al., 1999), firm 
performance achieved by a CEO is usually measured by accounting earnings as well 
as equity market returns (RET). Accounting earnings are calculated as net income 
before extraordinary items and discontinued operation (EBEI). In other words, a 
CEO’s achievements can be described as: ACHIEVEMENT = EBEI + RET.  
CEO compensation is thus determined by both accounting earnings and equity market 
returns of the current year (Lambert and Larcker, 1987). Moreover, accounting 
earnings and equity returns may have different weights in determining CEO 
compensation (Sloan, 1993; Bushman et al., 2002). To examine the explanatory 
powers of different performance measures, I express CEO compensation in terms of 
accounting earnings, equity returns and control variables as shown in Equation 2: 
CEOCOMP = β0 + β1*EBEI + β2*RET + β3*OTHERS + ε                           Equation 2 
Step III. Firm accounting earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued 
operations (EBEI) can be divided into two parts 13 : operating cash flows before 
adjusting for the firm’s non-cash extraordinary items and discontinued operations 
(OCFBEI), and total accounting accruals from discretionary transactions (ACCR). In 
other words, EBEI can be described as: EBEI = OCFBEI + ACCR. According to 
previous research (Clinch and Magliolo, 1993; Natarajan, 1996; Gaver and Gaver, 
1998), operating cash flows and total accruals may relate differently to the CEO’s 
performance. Considering the potential different effects of operating cash flows and 
accruals, I specify Equation 2 as following Equation 3: 
                                                        
13 I follow the method of Phillips et al. (2003) and use data from the cash flow statement to estimate total accruals. 
According to them, earnings from continuing operation equal to cash flows from continuing operations plus total 
accruals. Using data from Compustat, EBEI = (OCF - EIDO) + ACCR. The data item No. for EBEI, OCF and 
EIDO are #123, #308, and #124, respectively. 
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CEOCOMP = β0 + β1*OCFBEI + β2* ACCR + β3* RET + β4*OTHERS + ε  
 Equation 3 
Step IV. Employee stock options (ESO) are the stock options issued to all the 
employees of a firm. In a responsibility accounting system, a CEO is evaluated on the 
revenue and expense items over which he has control. According to Zhang (2002), a 
CEO is responsible for all revenue and expense items of the firm and he can decide on 
the employee stock options program. Aboody et al. (2004) also argue that investors 
perceive the employee stock options as an expense of the firm. Therefore, if a firm 
adopts the responsibility accounting system and regards employee stock options as an 
ordinary expense incurred by the CEO to realize his achievements in the same period, 
the firm may base the CEO’s compensation on earnings after deducting option costs. 
In this case, the relationship between employee stock options and CEO compensation 
is negative. Therefore, I include employee stock options in the CEO compensation 
equation: 
CEOCOMP = β0+β1*OCFBEI + β2* ACCR +β3* RET + β4* OTHERS + β5* ESO + ε                        
Equation 4 
Step V. The other item examined is R&D expenditures (RD). R&D expenditures are 
treated under U.S. GAAP as an expense to be charged against accounting earnings. If 
a firm considers R&D expenditures to be an ordinary expense with highly uncertain 
future benefits when it determines CEO compensation internally, CEO compensation 
will be penalized for the expense. Therefore, R&D expenditures may have a negative 
effect on CEO compensation like other expenses. 
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Alternatively, if a firm considers R&D expenditures as an investment with non-zero 
future benefits, the firm is expected to reward the CEO for the returns from this 
investment and penalize him for any risk or costs incurred. Specifically, there are four 
possible scenarios where the relationship between CEO compensation and R&D 
expenditures differs. First, the benefits of R&D expenditures have already been partly 
or fully impounded in the firm’s market performance in the current year. In this case, 
the CEO will be rewarded for the positive effect of the R&D project on the firm’s 
equity returns over the current year. As the R&D spending is the price the firm paid 
for these current benefits, CEO compensation will be negatively affected by this cost. 
Second, the firm believes that the R&D project can bring returns in the future. 
However, due to information asymmetry, the future benefits have not been 
impounded in the firm’s market performance in the current year (Lev and Sougiannis, 
1996). In such a case, the CEO will not be rewarded for the future benefits of the 
R&D project and not be affected by the R&D expenditures. Third, the firm 
encourages CEO to innovate through R&D spending that can bring significant returns 
in the future. The CEO is thus rewarded for undertaking the innovative project. In this 
case, R&D expenditures positively affect CEO compensation. Finally, the firm 
believes that the R&D project is too risky and will result in more future costs than 
benefits. The CEO could then be penalized for his bad decision on R&D expenditures 
through the current year’s compensation.  
To investigate the effect of R&D expenditures (RD) on CEO compensation, R&D 
expenditures are considered to be an independent variable in the equation. Since an 
R&D project is an operating transaction that gives rise to cash outflows and reduces 
the item OCFBEI, RD is added back to OCFBEI to create a new item OCFT: 
OCFBEI before R&D costs. The CEO compensation equation is thus described as: 
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CEOCOMP = β0 + β1* OCFT + β2* ACCR +β3* RET + β4* OTHERS + β5* ESO+ 
β6*RD + ε  
  Equation 5 
Equation 5 is the fundamental equation for this study. If a CEO is compensated based 
on the items controllable by him (the responsibility principle), any such items that 
reduce the firm’s performance will lead to decrease in CEO compensation. Both 
employee stock option costs and R&D expenditures are controllable by a CEO, as he 
is involved in deciding both employee stock options as well as the R&D projects of 
the firm. Hence, the relationships of CEO compensation with employee stock options 
and R&D expenditures may suggest how the firm internally treats the two accounting 
items. The next section predicts the relationships between dependent and independent 
variables and provides possible explanations. 
3.3 Measures and Predictions 
The regression in this study is based on Equation 5 in the previous section. For each 
sample year, the dependent variable, CEO compensation, is regressed on the 
independent variables which consist of employee stock options, R&D expenditures, 
firm performance measures and other control variables. 
3.3.1 CEO Compensation 
Total compensation paid to a CEO includes cash payments such as salary (fixed cash 
payments) and bonus (variable cash payments), as well as stock-based awards 
including stock options and restricted stocks. Considering the increasing use of stock 
options as long-term incentive compensation, Cathro (1996), a principal with the 
international compensation-consulting firm William M. Mercer, comments that a 
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firm’s compensation committee would establish “a mix of pay that includes the 
estimated value of the long-term incentives as part of a total compensation package” 
(p. 21).  
When compensation is paid in two or more forms, their relative mix is determined by 
factors that influence both the marginal costs and benefits to the firm (Woodbury, 
1983). William White (1992), the national director of Compensation Services for 
Ernst and Young, suggests that firms use various vehicles of executive compensation 
to balance executive safety and risk factors. Also, specific attention should be paid to 
the level of fixed pay (base salary) versus variable pay (annual and long-term 
incentives). 
Different components of total compensation, however, may have different 
determinants. Anderson et al. (1999) find that salary, bonus and stock-based awards 
respond differently to firm performance as measured by accounting earnings and 
equity returns. The weight placed on equity returns relative to accounting returns is 
higher for stock-based awards than for cash bonus compensation. In this study, I 
decompose CEO compensation and examine cash compensation (the sum of salary 
and bonus), stock-based compensation, and total compensation individually. 
3.3.2 Independent Variables and Predictions of Their Relationships with CEO 
Compensation 
In this study, all the independent variables that may determine CEO compensation are 
categorized into three groups. The first group includes firm performance as measured 
by (1) accounting measures such as operating cash flows (before deducting R&D 
expenditures and before adjusting for extraordinary items and discontinued operations) 
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and total accruals, and (2) market measures such as cumulative equity returns to 
shareholders. The second group is a set of control variables that the literature suggests 
may affect executive compensation. These control variables include personal 
characteristics of the CEO, firm characteristics, and the previous year’s CEO 
compensation. Personal characteristics of the CEO are his age, tenure and ownership, 
while firm characteristics are firm size, growth opportunities and industry 
membership. The two controversial items, employee stock options and R&D 
expenditures, are in the last group. 
Firm Performance 
The performance of a firm brought about by the CEO can be measured by accounting-
based earnings and market-based equity returns. However, each of them has 
conceptual and methodological weaknesses as performance measures. Accounting-
based measures are subject to management manipulation and a firm’s stock market 
performance is sensitive to factors beyond the control of management (Sloan, 1993). 
To avoid the inherent biases in using either method alone, I use both accounting-based 
and market-based measures of firm performance in this study.  
EBEI (earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations) is a proxy for 
the accounting-based performance measure. As shown by prior studies (Clinch and 
Magliolo, 1993; Natarajan, 1996; Gaver and Gaver, 1998), these two components of 
earnings do not enter into the compensation function in the same way. Hence, I break 
EBEI down into two main parts – operating cash flows (OCFT) 14  and accruals 
(ACCR) in the regression. Since ACCR can be “managed” or “manipulated” more 
easily, it may have less effect on the CEO compensation than OCFT. Therefore, I 
                                                        
14 In my regressions, I examine R&D separately and the variable OCFT is defined as operating cash flows (OCF) 
before adjusting to firm’s non-cash extraordinary items and discontinued operations and before R&D expenditures. 
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predict that OCFT will be more dominant than ACCR in determining CEO 
compensation. 
To measure market-based performance, I use one-year stock market returns to 
shareholders. One-year stock market returns are defined as the sum of a firm’s capital 
gains and dividends divided by the stock price at the beginning of the year. Higher 
equity returns indicate good CEO performance, which would be associated with 
higher compensation.  
Since cash compensation is usually regarded as short-term incentive plans for 
executives, only current year accounting and market performance measures are used 
as independent variables in the CEO cash compensation equation in this study. In 
contrast, stock-based compensation is a type of long-term incentive compensation that 
may be affected by long-run firm performance. In other words, previous years’ firm 
performance may have an incremental effect on CEO stock-based compensation. 
Therefore, in the equation of CEO stock-based compensation, firm performance 
measures in the current year as well as in the previous year are included as 
independent variables. 
Growth Opportunities 
Stock options tend to align the interests of a CEO with those of the shareholders since 
a CEO holding stock options would benefit personally if the share price rises. If the 
CEO has more stock options, he will be more concerned about the firm’s future 
growth. Therefore, a firm with more valuable growth opportunities can use greater 
stock-based compensation to retain executives.  
CHAPTER 3 MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
 46
According to Gaver and Gaver (1995), the investment opportunity set is unobservable, 
and it is likely to be imperfectly measured by any individual proxy. As a result, they 
use an ensemble of variables to measure the investment opportunities. I follow their 
approach and include the market to book ratio of equity and the sales growth rate as 
proxies for growth opportunities. Market to book ratio (MBV) is a growth measure 
used frequently by earlier researchers (Fama and French, 1992; Gaver and Gaver, 
1995). It is the ratio of the market value of a firm (share closing price times 
outstanding shares) to the book value of its equity. The ratio thus relies on current 
stock price to assess a firm’s growth potential. Sales growth rate (SALESGTH) is the 
growth rate of the net sales of a firm, which has also been used by Bathala and Rao 
(1995) as a proxy for the firm’s growth opportunities. In this study, SALESGTH is 
calculated as the 3-year least-squares growth rate of sales15. Based on the literature 
(Lewellen et al., 1987; Clinch, 1991; Smith and Watts, 1992; Gaver and Gaver, 1995), 
the firm growth variables are expected to have positive coefficients in the regressions. 
Previous Year’s Compensation 
If a CEO has been in the position for more than one year, his compensation package 
for two consecutive years may not be completely independent. In other words, the 
CEO compensation or some components of the total compensation package could be 
based on the compensation he obtained in the previous year. Therefore, the previous 
year’s CEO compensation is included in the regressions as an independent variable. 
                                                        
15  The use of 3 years’ sale growth rate follows Comment and Schwert (1995). The least-squares trend is a 
commonly used growth indicator. It has the following advantages: first, it takes into account each of the 
observations under consideration, unlike geometric (or compound) growth rates, which only consider the first and 
last observations; second, it measures the stability of observed growth; finally, unlike the arithmetic average of 
annual growth rates, it takes into account the sequence of different growth rates over time. 
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Other Determinants of CEO Compensation 
I include other exogenous variables in the compensation equations based on economic 
theory and prior empirical research. Specifically, I consider firm size (measured by 
sales revenue in the fiscal year), CEO age, CEO tenure, CEO ownership (as the 
percentage of a firm’s shares held by the CEO), and industry membership. Industry 
dummy variables are used to control for the possibility of correlations among the 
variables operating through industry effects. Based on the results of prior research, it 
is predicted that the size variable will have a positive coefficient while the CEO 
ownership variable will have a negative coefficient.  
Employee Stock Options (ESO) 
If a firm regards employee stock options as an ordinary expense incurred by the CEO 
to realize his achievements in the same period, the firm may base the CEO’s 
compensation on earnings after deducting option costs. In this case, the relationship 
between employee stock options and CEO compensation is negative. Aboody et al. 
(2004) find that employee stock options are negatively related with share price. They 
therefore argue that investors perceive the employee stock options as an expense of 
the firm. Since the compensation committee of a firm (a committee of the board of the 
directors) represents the interests of shareholders, the committee may also view the 
employee stock options as an expense and penalize the CEO compensation for this 
item. Therefore, in this study I predict that employee stock options negatively affect 
CEO compensation.  
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R&D Expenditures (RD) 
The controversy surrounding R&D expenditures centers on whether the item should 
be treated as an investment or an expense. If R&D expenditures are treated as an 
expense to be charged against accounting earnings, R&D expenditures could 
negatively affect CEO compensation. If R&D expenditures are treated as an 
investment, this item’s effect on CEO compensation may vary in different scenarios 
(Step V., Section 3.2). If the relationship between CEO compensation and R&D 
expenditures is found to be negative, this study does not intend to offer a definitive 
explanation. However, if a non-negative coefficient is identified in the regression, it 
suggests that firms regard R&D expenditures as an investment. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA 
 
4.1 Methodology 
The methodology of this study is derived in this chapter. The basic regression is the 
compensation level model. Sensitivity tests are conducted using the compensation 
change model and the compensation level model using market-adjusted returns of 
equity.  
4.1.1 Basic Regression (Compensation Level Model) 
This study examines the determinants of CEO compensation and relationship of CEO 
compensation with both employee stock options and R&D expenditures. The models 
relate CEO compensation in year t to firm performance, characteristics of the firm and 
its CEO, employee stock options, and R&D expenditures. The use of cross-sectional 
regression is based on the assumption that the relationship between CEO 
compensation and the independent variables do not change significantly over time.  
The effects of various factors may differ across the components of CEO compensation. 
For example, previous year’s performance may affect CEO stock-based compensation 
but not affect cash compensation in the current year. Thus, I examine the different 
components of CEO compensation in different equations: cash compensation 
(CASHPAY), stock-based compensation (STKPAY), and total compensation (TTPAY). 











                                                        Equation I (a) 







































Equation I (c) 
The independent variables are defined as follows: 
CASHPAYt — CEO cash compensation in year t, calculated by the sum of salary and 
bonus. 
STKPAYt — CEO stock-based compensation in year t, calculated by the sum of stock 
options and restricted stocks. 
TTPAYt — CEO total annual compensation in year t, calculated by the sum of cash 
compensation, stock-based compensation and other annual payment. 
OCFTt — Operating cash flows before adjusting for non-cash extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations and before deducting R&D expenditures, calculated as: 
OCFT = OCF – EIDO + RD, where OCF is operating cash flows (annual Compustat 
data item #308), EIDO is non-cash extraordinary items and discontinued operations 
(annual Compustat data item #124). The item is deflated by the total assets of year t16. 
ACCRt — Total accruals in year t, deflated by the total assets in year t. Total accruals 
are earnings from continuing operations minus cash flows from continuing operations. 
                                                        
16 In my cross-sectional regression, the option cost, R&D expenditures, OCFT, ACCR and previous year’s 
compensation are deflated by the book value of total assets in order to enhance cross-sectional comparability and 
minimize any heteroscedasticity caused by firm variances. 
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It can be described as: ACCR = EBEI – (OCF – EIDO)17, where EBEI is a firm’s net 
income before extraordinary items (annual Compustat data item #123). 
RETt — Cumulative equity return to shareholders over the 12-month period of a 
firm’s fiscal year t, used to measure market performance of the firm in the current year. 
It is defined as the sum of the firm’s stock price at the end of each sample year and 
dividends over the whole calendar year divided by the stock price at the beginning of 
the same year (all the sample firms have a December fiscal year-end). 
MBV — A proxy for growth or investment opportunities, measured by market value 
of a firm to the book value of its equity. 
SALESGTH — 3-year least-squares growth rate of sales, another proxy for a firm’s 
growth opportunities. 
SIZEt — Firm size, measured by the sales of a firm in year t.  
AGEt — Age of CEO who was in office during the sample year t. 
TENUREt — Number of years since the time of CEO appointment to year t.  
CEOSHt — CEO ownership, measured by the percentage of a firm’s common stocks 
held by the CEO at the end of sample year t.  
ESOt — Employee stock option costs of a firm in year t18. This is the fair market 
value of the firm’s total award of stock-based compensation for employees at the 
grant date, computed as the difference between pro forma net income and reported net 
                                                        
17 All the financial figures in my thesis come from Compustat. Since Compustat obtains these numbers from 
annual reports, I assume that these figures are correct and prepared according to the U.S. GAAP.  
18 This variable includes CEO stock options. The ratio of CEO stock options to the employee stock options is on 
average 15% in my sample.  
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income in the annual reports (annual Compustat data item #39919), deflated by the 
total assets of year t.  
RDt — Annual R&D expenditures (annual Compustat data item #46), deflated by the 
total assets of year t. 
INDi — Industry dummy variables are used to control for the possibility of 
correlations among the variables operating through industry effects.  
4.1.2 Sensitivity Tests  
I use two sensitivity tests based on the basic compensation level model. These 
sensitivity tests consider the omitted variable problem, and the use of market-adjusted 
returns of equity as opposed to unadjusted ROE. 
4.1.2.1 Compensation Change Model 
Murphy (1985) observes that the cross-sectional differences in firm characteristics 
and the characteristics of executives are likely to influence relationship between 
executive compensation and firm performance. Failure to control for these factors 
would cause an omitted variable problem20 and lead to biased estimates in empirical 
models that relate compensation levels to firm performance. Murphy dealt with this 
problem by using a first-difference specification of the compensation model, as the 
                                                        
19 Compustat data item #399 represents the decrease in net income attributable to the added expense of options 
that is not fully recognized on the firm’s Income Statement. Most companies choose to apply APB 25 and disclose 
the pro forma net income in footnotes as if compensation costs had been determined based on SFAS 123. Since the 
option prices were greater than or equal to the market prices at the date of grant, most companies have not 
recognized the compensation cost for stock options. Thus, the difference between pro forma net income and net 
income as reported in income statement can be considered as the compensation expense for stock options (after-tax 
effect) in the current period.  
20 Missing variables problem: if some relevant regressors are omitted from the linear regression model, and if the 
missing variables are correlated with other explanatory variable, the estimators will be biased. Omitted-variable 
bias is generally considered a serious problem and should be avoided whenever possible. 
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lagged compensation values would be informative about the characteristics of the firm 
and its executive.  
Moreover, there may be a dynamic response of executive compensation to unexpected 
firm performance. A first difference model is a way to investigate how the changes in 
executive compensation are related to the “surprises” in the independent variables. 
Under the assumption that an executive’s true productivity behaves as a random walk, 
there may be a permanent change in compensation. In other words, changes in CEO 
compensation associated with firm performance shocks persist over time (Anderson et 
al., 1999). Therefore, changes in earnings may be helpful to properly specify the 
relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance. 
Based on the above considerations, I use a compensation change model, which relates 
the change in CEO compensation in two consecutive years to the changes in firm 
performance, employee stock option costs, and R&D expenditures. This model 
investigates the reaction of CEO compensation to the change in performance as well 
as the changes in the firm’s employee stock option costs and R&D expenditures. By 
first differencing, the model could resolve the missing variable problem cited by 
Murphy (1985). The assumption here is that some factors do not change over time for 
individual CEO, such as firm growth, the CEO’s age, the CEO’s tenure and industry 
membership of the firm. Therefore, the independent variables that are fixed or 
relatively fixed in the two consecutive years can be omitted in the first-difference 
model. These variables include MBV, SALESGTH, AGE, TENURE and industry 
dummies.  
Similar to the compensation level model, I examine the different components of CEO 
compensation: cash compensation, stock-based compensation, and total annual 
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compensation. Their changes are △CASHPAY, △STKPAY, and △TTPAY 
respectively. Hence, the following equations are derived: 
aRDESOCEOSHSIZERETACCROCFTCASHPAY εβββββββ +∆+∆+∆+∆+∆+∆+∆=∆ 7654321  
Equation II (a) 
 
bRDESOCEOSHSIZERETACCROCFTSTKPAY εβββββββ +∆+∆+∆+∆+∆+∆+∆=∆ 7654321  
Equation II (b) 
 
cRDESOCEOSHSIZERETACCROCFTTTPAY εβββββββ +∆+∆+∆+∆+∆+∆+∆=∆ 7654321  
Equation II (c) 
 
4.1.2.2 Compensation Level Model using Market-Adjusted Returns of Equity 
In the equations I (a), I (b) and I (c), I use raw returns – 12-month cumulative equity 
returns to shareholders (RETt) – to measure the firm’s market performance. This is a 
common method used by previous studies on executive compensation (Ely, 1991; 
Baber et al., 1996). However, it is possible that CEO compensation is only related to 
the firm-specific component of stock returns. To address the link of CEO 
compensation to the firm-specific influence of stock returns, I replace raw returns 
with market-adjusted returns in the CEO compensation equations. Market-adjusted 
returns of sample firms are estimated by using the market model, which is specified 
as:  
Ri,τ = α + β*Rm,τ + εi,τ, 
where Ri,τ is the raw return for firm i over period τ, Rm,τ is the return on market 
portfolio m over the same period τ, and εi,τ is the zero mean disturbance term. In this 
study, I use the returns on S&P 500 Composite Index21 as the proxy for the returns on 
                                                        
21 S&P 500 Composite Index is a capitalization-weighted index of 500 US stocks. The index is designed to 
measure performance of the broad domestic economy through changes in the aggregate market value of 500 stocks 
representing all major industries. The index was developed with a base level of 10 for the 1941-1943 base period. 
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market portfolio Rm,τ. The regression is estimated for each sample firm by using 
monthly returns of the firm and monthly returns on the S&P 500 Index over the 60 
months prior to the sample year 199822. With the estimated β, I calculate the 
market-adjusted annual return (ARETt) for the firm by deducting β times the annual 
return on S&P 500 Index from the raw annual return RETt for each sample year. Then, 
the regressions for short-term and long-term incentive schemes from equations I (a), I 
(b) and I (c) are estimated using calculated ARETt instead of RETt. Hence, equations 































Equation III (b) 
 
where 
ARETt — Market-adjusted returns of firms over the 12-month period of a firm’s 
fiscal year t, calculated as ARETt = RETt – β*Rm,t. RETt is the firm’s cumulative 
equity returns to shareholders over the fiscal year t, as used in equations I (a), I (b) 
and I (c). Rm,t is the annual return on the S&P 500 Composite Index over the sample 
year t, calculated by the percentage change in the index value from the beginning to 
the end of each sample year.  
                                                                                                                                                               
Return on S&P 500 index is calculated by the change in the value from the beginning to the end of each sample 
year. 
22 β may change through time. In my thesis, I overlook the possible change and use β estimated prior to calendar 
year 1998 for the regressions of three sample years.  
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4.2 Data Sources and Sample Selection 
This section first explains the data sources and the sample selection method. Then, it 
presents the descriptive statistics on CEO compensation, employee stock option costs, 
R&D expenditures, firm performance and other control variables. 
4.2.1 Data Sources and Sample Selection Method 
The sample is composed of publicly listed U.S. firms during 1998, 1999 and 2000 
calendar years. CEO compensation data and CEO information are collected from the 
COMPUSTAT Executive Compensation files. Employee stock option costs, R&D 
expenditures, firm information, and financial statements data of the firms are obtained 
from the COMPUSTAT annual industrial files. S&P 500 Composite Index values and 
firm equity returns are obtained from CRSP (Center for Research in Security Prices).  
The following data selection criteria are considered: 
(1) The firm has both accounting data and CEO compensation data reported in the 
COMPUSTAT files. 
(2) The firm has a December fiscal year-end for each sample year. This criterion is 
used because Smith and Pourciau (1988) show that firms with December fiscal 
year-end and non-December fiscal year-end have significant differences in financial 
characteristics.  
(3) The employee stock option cost (annual Compustat data item #399) of the firm is 
not zero for the sample year(s). This means that the firm chooses to apply APB 25 and 
disclose the pro forma net income in footnotes as if the compensation cost had been 
determined based on the fair value based accounting method suggested in SFAS 123. 
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(4) R&D expenditures (annual Compustat data item #46) of the firm are not zero for 
the sample year(s). 
(5) For the compensation change model, the firm must have the same CEO who was 
in office for two consecutive years. 
The number of sample firms for the compensation level model is 205, 407 and 231 for 
calendar years 1998, 1999 and 2000 respectively. The number of sample firms varies 
for the sensitivity tests due to the change in variables and data selection criteria. 
The number of industry dummy variables is decided by the industry categories of the 
sample firms. The four-digit SIC code23 is used to identify 10 different industries. 
Since the distribution of the samples skews heavily towards the manufacturing 
industry, the sample firms from manufacturing industry are divided into 4 categories 
according to the sample distribution. Some industries with small samples are also 
combined into one category. In total, 6 industry categories are identified and 5 
dummy variables are included in the regressions. The industry distribution for the 
sample firms is shown in following Table 1.  
 
 
                                                        
23 Four-digit SIC codes partition firms into 10 industries: 1. Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing (0100-0999); 2. 
Mining (1000-1499); 3. Construction (1500-1799); 4. Manufacturing (2000-3999); 5. Transportation, 
Communications, and Utilities (4000-4999); 6. Wholesale Trade (5000-5199); 7. Retail Trade (5200-5999); 8. 
Financial, Insurance, and Real Estate (6000-6999); 9. Service (7000-9099); and 10. Public Administration 
(9100-9999). 




Table 1: Sample Industry Distribution 
 
Industry distribution of the samples skews heavily towards manufacturing. The firms in the manufacturing industry are divided into 4 categories. Also, some 
industries with small number of firms are combined into one category. 6 industry groups are identified and 5 dummy variables are included in the regressions. 
 
Category Industry Name 4-Digit SIC Code 1998 1999 2000 Industry Dummy Variables 
(1) Chemicals and allied products 2800-2899 42 85 47 IND1 
(2) Industrial and commercial machinery and computer equipment 3500-3599 23 53 26 IND2 
(3) Electronic and other electrical equipment and components, except computer 3600-3699 31 68 37 IND3 




71 105 78  
 Total Manufacturing  167 311 189  











































 Total Others  12 27 11  
 Total Samples  205 407 231  
 
 




Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 1998 (Samples: 205) 1999 (Samples: 407) 2000 (Samples: 231) 
Variable Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. 
             
CEO Salary (Th$) 3.6  1900.0 491.2 280.9 3.6 995.7 476.1 245.7 81.8 2500.0 609.5  306.8  
CEO Bonus (Th$) 0.0  2803.6 418.2 493.5 0.0 13900.0 672.8 1123.1 0.0 14276.0 691.9  1141.8  
Other Annual Payment (Th$) 0.0  1332.7 26.5 111.4 0.0 6353.0 57.4 336.9 0.0 556.6 29.6  80.8  
CEO Stock Options (Th$) 0.0  42428.4 1560.4 3427.0 0.0 167306.6 3885.14 10993.4 0.0 290594.9 4191.0  19562.5  
Restricted Stocks (Th$) 0.0  21873.9 294.6 1729.8 0.0 22781.3 445.4 1902.6 0.0 13153.0 321.2  1332.3  
CASHPAY (Th$) 3.6  3820.3 909.4 705.3 0.0 14000.4 1148.8 1171.2 81.8 15251.0 1301.5  1311.5  
STKPAY (Th$) 0.0  42428.4 1855.0 3946.1 0.0 167306.6 4330.5 11361.2 0.0 290594.9 4476.0  19588.4  
TTPAY (Th$) 66.0  43228.4 2790.9 4222.5 81.84 168849.3 5557.5 11691.0 81.8 293097.0 5807.0  19714.4  
ESO (M$) 0.0001  313.0 10.4 30.4 0.001 901.0 25.5 72.9 0.0001 836.0 28.5  76.8  
RD (M$) 0.4  3060.0 150.4 448.5 0.1 7900.0 210.1 691.3 0.4 4769.0 168.2  509.6  
Total Assets (M$) 5.1  92630.0 3704.3 9242.6 6.1 405200.0 6756.8 28651.3 11.2 149000.0 4584.6  12480.9  
OCFT (M$) -20.0  11865.0 530.2 1498.6 -222.0 36911.0 888.4 3155.4 -270.4 23809.0 690.3  2227.4  
ACCR (M$) -4686.0  292.7 -172.5 504.8 -22574.0 2297.0 -363.8 1754.1 -7255.0 2482.0 -190.7  678.5  
RET (%) -85.9  966.4 27.6 97.1 -69.9 1494.3 64.4 157.2 -94.0 478.0 16.7  81.7  
MBV -366.4  571.6 6.7 48.8 -386.5 128.4 5.9 25.7 -52.7 25.4 3.7  6.9  
SALESGTH (%) -34.6  947.9 25.5 79.0 -61.4 3559.3 35.0 184.3 -69.1 326.9 23.6  36.8  
SIZE (M$) 3.7  100697.0 3542.1 9493.0 0.1 173215.0 5071.6 16153.0 1.1 206083.0 4366.5  15138.9  
AGE 39.0  88.0 57.0 7.7 36.0 86.0 55.7 7.8 39.0 88.0 56.6  7.7  
TENURE 0.0  42.0 7.0 7.5 0.0 51.0 7.2 7.2 2.0 44.0 8.4  7.5  
CEOSH (%) 0.0  461.7 31.1 71.5 0.0 55.7 2.6 6.4 0.0 423.9 26.6  61.0  
Th$ - Thousands of Dollars      M$ - Millions of Dollars      % - Percentage




4.2.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2. Table 3 and Figure 1 present the 
changes in the structure of the CEO compensation package from 1998 to 2000. The 
mean is calculated for 205, 407 and 231 firms respectively. It shows that CEO stock 
options occupy around 50% of CEO compensation and have the biggest growth 
during these three years. The CAGR (Compound Annual Growth Rate) of CEO stock 
options during the three years is more than 60%, with 6.5% increase from 1998 to 
1999. Salary, as the major part of CEO cash compensation, occupies 30% of the total 
compensation in average.  
 
Table 3: Changes in CEO Compensation  
 
 
1998 1999 2000 1998-2000 CEO 













        
Salary 491.2 33.5% 476.1 25.9% 609.5 29.5% 11.4% 
Bonus 418.2 17.2% 672.8 17.9% 691.9 19.0% 28.6% 
Stock Options 1560.4 44.3% 3885.1 50.0% 4191.0 45.8% 63.9% 
Restricted Stocks 294.6 4.1% 445.4 4.9% 321.2 4.6% 4.4% 
Other Payment 26.5 0.9% 57.4 1.2% 29.6 1.1% 5.7% 
TOTAL 2790.9 100% 5557.5 100% 5807.0 100% 44.2% 
 
Note: CAGR (Compound Annual Growth Rate) is the year over year growth rate over a 





















Stock-Based Compensation * Salary Bonus Other Payment
 
* Stock-Based Compensation = Stock Options + Restricted Stocks 
Table 4 shows the correlation matrix of the independent variables in the study for 
calendar year 1999. The pair-wise correlations among the independent variables are 
moderate to low. The correlation matrices of the independent variables for 1998 and 
2000 have similar results. I use Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs)24 to test for 
multicollinearity. The VIF is calculated for every independent variable in each 
regression25 of the compensation level model. All the VIFs are much lower than 10, 
which is the indicator of multicollinearity. This suggests that multicollinearity is not a 
significant problem in interpreting the regression results.
                                                        
24 Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) are one measure that can be used to detect multicollinearity (condition indices 
are another). Variance inflation factors are a scaled version of the multiple correlation coefficients between one 
independent variable and the rest of the independent variables. A value greater than 10 is an indication of potential 
multicollinearity problems. 
25 All the VIF values are presented in Appendix 2, Multicollinearity Test for Compensation Level Model.  
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Table 4: Correlation Matrix for Contemporaneous Variables for 1999 
 
 
 ESO99 RD99 OCFT99 ACCR99 RET99 MBV SALESGTH SIZE99 AGE99 TENURE99 CEOSH99 OCFT98 ACCR98 RET98 
ESO99 1 0.391 0.083 -0.44 0.247 0.189 0.486 -0.111 -0.221 -0.076 0.062 -0.106 -0.336 0.277 
RD99  1 0.288 -0.215 0.109 -0.012 0.057 -0.088 -0.135 -0.004 -0.008 0.217 -0.071 -0.027 
OCFT99   1 -0.127 0.028 0.081 -0.04 -0.035 0.016 0.023 -0.032 0.572 0.029 0.118 
ACCR99   1 0.085 -0.105 -0.265 0.017 0.061 0.086 -0.006 0.164 0.418 -0.003 
RET99   1 0.026 0.255 -0.096 -0.218 0.077 0.162 0.048 -0.037 0.187 
MBV   1 0.302 -0.013 -0.086 -0.055 0.14 0.091 -0.08 0.251 
SALESGTH   1 -0.045 -0.127 -0.05 0.073 -0.187 -0.208 0.624 
SIZE99    1 0.071 -0.066 -0.11 -0.031 0.021 0.003 
AGE99    1 0.401 0.054 0.001 0.045 -0.147 
TENURE99    1 0.392 0.015 0.057 -0.004 
CEOSH99    1 -0.045 0.074 0.177 
OCFT98    1 -0.1 0.182 
ACCR98    1 0.005 
RET98     1 
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CHAPTER 5 
ESTIMATION AND RESULTS 
 
5.1 Compensation Level Model 
The equations I (a), I (b), and I (c) are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
procedures for calendar years 1998, 1999 and 2000 separately. Table 5, Table 6 and 
Table 7 present the results for equations with three different dependent variables 
respectively.  
Cash Compensation 
Table 5 shows the results for the cash compensation equation for the three 
consecutive years. The standardized coefficients and t-statistics are presented to 
compare the strength of different independent variables in affecting the dependent 
variables. The results from Panel B indicate a good fit for the CEO cash compensation 
model in 1999. About 62.3% of the variability in CEO cash compensation is 
explained by the regression. Among the three years, the model has the lowest R² of 
21.5% for 2000.  
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OCFTt 0.000  0.01  0.061 1.70*  0.097 1.41  
ACCRt -0.050  -0.84  0.047 1.37  0.010 0.16  
RETt 0.279  3.18** 0.008 0.24  0.006 0.09  
MBV -0.030  -0.52  0.028 0.89  0.048 0.73  
SALESGTH -0.238  -2.73** -0.021 -0.59  -0.063 -0.83  
SIZEt 0.457  7.91** 0.741 24.26**  0.318 5.24** 
AGEt 0.195  2.94** 0.049 1.38  0.136 1.91*  
TENUREt 0.023  0.32  0.061 1.66*  0.200 2.66** 
CEOSHt -0.093  -1.37  -0.095 -2.80**  -0.188 -2.69** 
CASHPAYt-1 -0.106  -1.80*  -0.051 -1.44  -0.105 -1.42  
ESOt  -0.205  -2.11** -0.087 -2.17**  -0.035 -0.38  
RDt  0.035  0.36  -0.002 -0.06  -0.058 -0.73  
IND1 0.110  1.65  0.015 0.42  -0.033 -0.46  
IND2 -0.008  -0.13  -0.048 -1.46  -0.076 -1.17  
IND3 -0.057  -0.87  -0.023 -0.65  -0.021 -0.30  
IND4 0.012  0.18  -0.040 -1.10  -0.030 -0.38  
IND5 -0.003  -0.04  0.001 0.04  -0.024 -0.38  
       
Sample Size 205  407  231  
R² (Adjusted) 0.385  0.623  0.215  
       
 
**  Significant at the level of 5% 
*   Significant at the level of 10% 
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As seen from Table 5, the evidence on the relationship between CEO compensation 
and firm performance is mixed. Equity returns (RET) have significantly positive 
relationship with cash compensation in 1998. In 1999, however, cash compensation is 
positively related to the accounting performance measure OCFT at the 10% 
significance level. In 2000, the explanatory powers of both OCFT and RET are weak. 
Therefore, the link between CEO cash compensation and firm performance may 
change over time. As for accruals, ACCR does not have significant effect on cash 
compensation for all the sample years. This result is consistent with the argument that 
a firm’s compensation committee may realize that the accruals are easily “managed” 
or “manipulated” and therefore does not consider the item when evaluating the CEO’s 
performance. 
The coefficient for firm size (SIZE) is positive at the significance level of 5% for all 
the sample years. The evidence is consistent with prior research that firm size has a 
strong positive relationship with executive compensation. 
As a proxy for firm growth opportunities, market to book ratio (MBV) does not 
achieve statistical significance for all the sample years. Also, CEO cash compensation 
is not related to 3-year sales growth rate (SALESGTH) for 1999 and 2000. It suggests 
that cash compensation is a reward for current performance and less or even not 
affected by firm growth opportunities. 
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Among CEO characteristics, cash compensation is related to both CEO age (AGE) 
and CEO tenure (TENURE) at the significant level of 10% for two out of three 
sample years. The possible explanation is that the age and the tenure of a CEO 
represent his general training levels or experience, which could be a factor positively 
affect cash compensation.  
A negative and statistically significant coefficient is reported for CEO ownership 
(CEOSH) for 1999 and 2000. Many studies have also reported a negative relationship 
between CEO compensation and the CEO’s share ownership (Bryan, et al., 2000; 
Ryan and Wiggins, 2001). It is consistent with the notion that as a CEO holds a large 
fraction of the firm’s shares, he will be rewarded via the returns on his investment 
(dividends and capital appreciation of the shares). With this benefit, the CEO’s 
interest is more aligned with the shareholders of the firm and his demand for cash 
compensation will be less (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
The coefficient for CASHPAYt-1 is only negative for 1998 at the significance level of 
10%. It seems that previous year’s cash compensation generally does not have 
incremental effect on current year’s cash compensation.  
The coefficient for employee stock option costs (ESO) is significantly negative for 
both 1998 and 1999, with the t-statistics of -2.11 and -2.17 respectively. This result is 
consistent with my prediction (Section 3.3.2), suggesting that firms treat employee 
stock option costs as an ordinary expense incurred by the CEO to realize his 
achievements for the current year.  
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For 2000, the coefficient for ESO is negative but not statistically significant. This 
result may come from the poor market condition over the second half year of 2000. 
The following chart presents the value changes in S&P 500 Index from the end of 
year 1996 to the end of year 200226. S&P 500 Index is a capitalization-weighted index 
of 500 U.S. stocks that represent all major industries. It is used to measure 
performance of the broad domestic economy of the United States. The index value 
increased from the beginning of 1997 and reached its highest point around August 
2000. The index value then started to drop till the end of 2000. In poor market 
conditions, stock options issued are possibly “out of money” and virtually worthless, 
although they may have large fair value calculated by using option pricing models. To 
encourage and retain CEOs by using stock-based compensation in 2000, the 
compensation committee may choose to base CEO compensation on earnings before 
employee stock option costs rather than after option costs. 
 
                                                        
26 The chart spots the values of S&P 500 Index at the end of each month from December of 1996 to December of 
2002. The data obtained from CRSP are given in the Appendix 3. 









12/31/1996 12/31/1997 12/31/1998 12/31/1999 12/29/2000 12/31/2001 12/31/2002 
Date 
Price 
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The coefficient for R&D expenditures (RD) is statistically indistinguishable from zero 
for all the sample years. Based on my hypothesis development (Section 3.3.2), the 
zero coefficient for R&D expenditures suggests that it is unlikely that firms regard 
R&D expenditures as an expense related to the current firm performance. Instead it 
suggests that firms may view R&D expenditures as a form of investment, with the 
future benefits not fully captured by the current equity returns. 
Industry does not have a significant effect on CEO cash compensation. It suggests that 
among the sample firms examined in this study, there is no significant industry 
variation in determining short-term incentive compensation.  
Stock-based Compensation 
Table 6 shows the results for CEO stock-based compensation (the sum of stock 
options and restricted stocks) for the 1998, 1999 and 2000 calendar years. Compared 
with the model fit for CEO cash compensation equation, the model fit for the 
stock-based compensation equation is relatively low, with an adjusted R² of 10.0%, 
25.1% and 13.9% for all the sample years respectively.  
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OCFTt 0.054 0.59  0.019 0.25  0.010 0.12 
ACCRt -0.056 -0.73  0.005 0.08  -0.060 -0.85  
RETt -0.166 -1.55  0.030 0.61  0.041 0.61 
MBV 0.138 1.99**  0.015 0.32  0.149 2.12** 
SALESGTH 0.221 2.03**  0.454 7.06** 0.182 2.22** 
SIZEt 0.303 4.34**  0.155 3.49** 0.111 1.74* 
AGEt 0.012 0.15  -0.03 -0.57  -0.087 -1.14  
TENUREt -0.065 -0.75  -0.102 -1.90*  -0.031 -0.39  
CEOSHt -0.001 -0.01  -0.029 -0.57  0.135 1.81* 
OCFTt-1 0.161 1.62  0.040 0.54  -0.005 -0.05  
ACCRt-1 -0.026 -0.29  -0.049 -0.91  -0.040 -0.52  
RETt-1 -0.039 -0.55  -0.126 -2.13** -0.046 -0.55  
STKPAYt-1 -0.043 -0.60  0.335 6.15** 0.499 5.70** 
ESOt  0.134 0.45  -0.213 -3.37** -0.366 -3.12** 
RDt  -0.234 1.12  -0.136 -2.11** 0.010 0.12 
IND1 0.113 1.40  0.062 1.21  0.065 0.87 
IND2 0.005 0.07  -0.003 -0.07  0.038 0.55 
IND3 0.045 0.57  -0.003 -0.06  0.032 0.44 
IND4 0.145 1.74*  0.011 0.21  0.057 0.68 
IND5 -0.041 -0.55  0.132 2.87** -0.026 -0.40  
       
Sample Size 205  407  231  
R² (Adjusted) 0.100  0.251  0.139  
 
**  Significant at the level of 5% 
*   Significant at the level of 10% 
Accounting and market performance for the current year have no significant influence 
on CEO stock-based compensation. In contrast, the significantly positive coefficients 
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are observed for two measures of growth opportunities (MBV and SALESGTH) for 
all the sample years. This is consistent with earlier studies that accounting and equity 
returns have no influence on stock-based compensation (Murphy, 1985; Baber et al., 
1996; Veliyath, 1999) and high-growth firms are more likely to use stock-based 
compensation for their executives (Lewellen et al., 1987; Gaver and Gaver, 1993). 
The results for the cash compensation and stock-based compensation regressions 
suggest that cash compensation is more related to the current firm performance than 
stock-based compensation.  
In the equation for stock-based compensation, I include the variables measuring firm 
performance (accounting earnings and equity returns) in the previous year to examine 
whether long-term incentive compensation is affected by firm performance over 
several years. Most of these variables have zero coefficients, suggesting that CEO 
stock-based compensation is generally not related to previous performance. 
Firm size as measured by annual sales is also an important factor for CEO stock-based 
compensation as it is for CEO cash compensation. CEO age is not significantly 
related to CEO stock-based compensation, nor are CEO tenure and CEO shareholding 
in general. These results indicate that CEO stock-based compensation is more related 
to firm characteristics (size and growth opportunities) than to personal characteristics 
of the CEO.  
For both 1999 and 2000, CEO stock-based compensation in the previous year exhibits 
a positive effect on CEO stock-based compensation in the current year. One possible 
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explanation is that those firms that offer more stock options tend to continue offering 
more stock options in the following year.  
Similar to the CEO cash compensation equation, the coefficient for employee stock 
option costs is significantly negative for 1999 and 2000. The coefficient for ESO is 
zero for 1998. This result may be due to a possible relationship between CEO stock 
options (STKPAY) and employee stock options of the firm (ESO): the higher the 
STKPAY, the higher the ESO. This positive mechanical link may offset the negative 
relationship between CEO compensation and employee stock option costs, leaving a 
zero coefficient in the equation. However, the positive mechanical link is not 
significant in 1999 and 2000, when the stock options programs have been widely 
applied to all the employees.  
The coefficient for R&D expenditures is significantly negative for 1999 but zero for 
1998 and 2000. Hence, CEO stock-based compensation is generally not related to 
R&D expenditures. The result is consistent with the interpretation that R&D 
expenditures are generally regarded by firms as a kind of investment and the benefits 
of the R&D projects have not been captured by firm performance in the current year. 
The industry difference for stock-based compensation may exist between 
manufacturing industry and non-manufacturing industries. It appears that firms in 
manufacturing industry rely less on stock options as incentive compensation than 
other industries in 1998 and 1999. In 2000, however, industry differences in offering 
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stock options are not significant since stock-based compensation has been widely 
used among all the industries. 
Total Compensation 
The regression results for CEO total compensation equation I (c) are shown in Table 7. 
The model explains 13.2%, 22.0% and 11.1% of the variability in CEO total 
compensation for 1998, 1999 and 2000 respectively. 
Firm performance measures, including accounting performance as well as market 
performance measures, have statistically zero coefficients in the regression for all the 
sample years. It shows that although firm performance may affect CEO cash 
compensation (the results mentioned above), it does not have a significant effect on 
CEO total compensation which includes both cash and stock-based payments.  
Similar to CEO cash compensation and stock-based compensation equations, size is a 
factor affecting CEO total compensation. Firm growth opportunities have 
significantly positive influence on CEO total compensation, especially in 2000, both 
market to book ratio and sales growth have significantly positive coefficients. The 
characteristics of the CEO do not have significant effect on his total compensation, 
although they may affect CEO cash compensation.  
For both 1999 and 2000, CEO total compensation in the previous year exhibits a 
positive effect on CEO total compensation in the current year, similar to CEO 
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stock-based compensation equation. It shows that the firm which offers more 
compensation is likely to continue offering more compensation in the following year.  






































       
OCFTt 0.060  0.66 -0.005 -0.06 0.040  0.46 
ACCRt -0.058 -0.77 -0.019 -0.33 -0.071 -1.00 
RETt -0.107 -1.02 0.033  0.65 0.057  0.84 
MBV 0.127  1.86* 0.004  0.09 0.143  2.00** 
SALESGTH 0.169  1.60 0.444  6.77** 0.179  2.17** 
SIZEt 0.359  5.22** 0.238  5.25** 0.139  2.15** 
AGEt 0.047  0.59 -0.019 -0.37 -0.075 -0.97 
TENUREt -0.058 -0.68 -0.086 -1.57 -0.023 -0.29 
CEOSHt -0.020 -0.25 -0.052 -1.03 0.121  1.62 
OCFTt-1 0.131  1.34 0.079  1.04 0.007  0.07 
ACCRt-1 -0.040 -0.46 -0.022 -0.41 -0.028 -0.36 
RETt-1 -0.037 -0.53 -0.125 -2.09** -0.036 -0.44 
TTPAYt-1 -0.061 -0.89 0.268  4.53** 0.443  4.92** 
ESOt  0.083  0.71 -0.217 -3.33** -0.325 -2.74** 
RDt  -0.116 -1.12 -0.108 -1.39 -0.058 -0.71 
IND1 0.122  1.54 0.059  1.13 0.061  0.81 
IND2 0.001  0.01 -0.009 -0.18 0.037  0.54 
IND3 0.031  0.39 -0.004 -0.08 0.046  0.60 
IND4 0.138  1.68* 0.016  0.28 0.072  0.85 
IND5 -0.041 -0.55 0.091  1.91* -0.044 -0.64 
Sample Size 205  407  231  
R² (Adjusted) 0.132  0.220  0.111  
 
**  Significant at the level of 5% 
*   Significant at the level of 10% 
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Consistent with the results for CEO cash and stock-based compensation, employee 
stock options has a significantly negative effect on CEO total compensation for 1999 
and 2000. The results therefore suggest that firms treat employee stock options as an 
expense internally when they determine CEO compensation. Although the result in 
this study is open to other interpretations, it is consistent with the arguments of 
Aboody et al. (2004).  
The coefficient of R&D expenditures is insignificant for all the sample years. The 
result is, therefore, supportive of previous findings. 
As for industry membership, service industry is identified to have a higher CEO total 
compensation than that of other industries in 1998. In 1999, however, 
non-manufacturing and non-service industries have positive but marginally significant 
effects on CEO total compensation. 
5.2 Sensitivity Tests 
5.2.1 Compensation Change Model 
The compensation change model (equations II (a), II (b) and II (c)) examines the 
factors on the changes in compensation between two consecutive years. However, the 
OLS regressions for compensation change model are identified to have the problem of 
heteroskedasticity by the White’s test27. Scaling variables by total assets cannot 
                                                        
27 The White’s test is a test for heteroskedasticity in the residuals from a least squares regression. Ordinary least 
squares estimates are consistent in the presence heteroskedasticity, but the conventional computed standard errors 
are no longer valid. The problem can be corrected by using Heteroskedasticity Consistent Covariances or using 
weighted least squares to obtain more efficient estimates. 
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eliminate the problem. Therefore, the Heteroskedasticity Consistent Covariance 
matrix estimator is used to correct the standard errors. This method can provide 
consistent estimates of the coefficient covariances in the presence of 
heteroskedasticity of an unknown form. The results are presented in Table 8 and 
Table 9. 
Difference between 1999 and 1998 
Table 8 shows the results from the first difference regressions between 1999 and 1998. 
In Panel A, the equation relates the change in CEO cash compensation to the changes 
in the independent variables. Panel B and Panel C include the equations for the 
changes in CEO stock-based compensation and total compensation respectively.  
For the firm performance variables, the coefficients for OCFT change and ACCR 
change for all the three equations are not statistically significant. However, equity 
return surprises are positively related to the changes in compensation. The change in 
firm size has a significantly positive effect on the change in CEO cash compensation 
only. Also, the change in CEO shareholding negatively affects the change in CEO 
cash compensation. These results are consistent with those obtained from the 
compensation level model for 1998 and 1999. 
The coefficient for ESO change is significantly negative at the 10% significance level 
in Panel A. The increase in stock option costs reduces cash compensation, suggesting 
that employee stock option costs are considered to be a factor in determining the 
CHAPTER 5 ESTIMATION AND RESULTS 
 76
CEO’s cash compensation. However, the change in stock-based compensation or total 
compensation has negative but insignificant effect on the change in employee stock 
option costs from 1998 to 1999.  
The coefficients for the change in R&D expenditures are statistically near to zero for 
every equation. Consistent with the compensation level model, there is no significant 
relationship between R&D expenditures and CEO compensation.  
Table 8: CEO Compensation Change Model 
(1999-1998) 
 
Heteroskedasticity Consistent Covariance matrix estimator is used to provide correct estimates of 
the coefficient covariances in the presence of heteroskedasticity of an unknown form. 
 
aRDESOCEOSHSIZERETACCROCFTCASHPAY εβββββββ +∆+∆+∆+∆+∆+∆+∆=∆ 7654321
bRDESOCEOSHSIZERETACCROCFTSTKPAY εβββββββ +∆+∆+∆+∆+∆+∆+∆=∆ 7654321  
cRDESOCEOSHSIZERETACCROCFTTTPAY εβββββββ +∆+∆+∆+∆+∆+∆+∆=∆ 7654321  
 
    









       
 Estimates t Estimates t Estimates t 
       
△OCFT 0.05  0.42 0.004  1.33 3.83  1.40 
△ACCR 0.10  0.81 0.005  1.17 4.72  1.23 
△RET 0.66  3.27** 0.007  2.31* 7.45  2.48** 
△SIZE 0.17  9.20** 0.000  0.26 0.18  1.55 
△CEOSH -52.63  -2.54** -0.786  -1.16 -839.17 -1.21 
△ESO  -2.31  -1.67* 0.021  1.50 18.58  1.32 
△RD  -0.42  -1.37 -0.021  -1.01 -17.59 -0.92 
       
Sample Size 329  329  329  
R² (Adjusted) 0.521  0.074  0.085  
 
**  Significant at the level of 5% 
*   Significant at the level of 10% 
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Difference between 2000 and 1999 
The results from the first difference regressions between 2000 and 1999 are reported 
in Table 9. Panel A, Panel B and Panel C include the equations for the changes in 
CEO cash compensation, CEO stock-based compensation and total compensation 
respectively. 
Table 9: CEO Compensation Change Model 
(2000-1999) 
 
    










       
 Estimates t Estimates t Estimates t 
       
△OCFT 0.84  2.17** 5.31  0.58  6.16  0.68 
△ACCR -0.04  -0.36  -1.84  -0.88  -1.87 -0.89 
△RET 0.06  0.15  4.34  1.64*  4.34  1.61 
△SIZE 0.18  3.29** 0.02  0.31  0.16  2.35* 
△CEOSH -3.55  -1.35  -21.49  -1.16  -25.02 -1.23 
△ESO  0.20  0.24  27.07  0.76  27.13  0.76 
△RD  -0.02  -0.16  -5.68  -1.01  -5.70 -1.02 
       
Sample Size 298  298  298  
R² (Adjusted) 0.189  0.002  0.005  
 
**  Significant at the level of 5% 
*   Significant at the level of 10% 
 
The change in OCFT positively affects the change in CEO cash compensation only. 
Also, there is a positive relationship between the change in equity returns and the 
change in stock-based compensation. CEO total compensation is not significantly 
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determined by firm performance. It suggests that accounting performance affects 
short-term incentive compensation while stock market performance influences 
long-term incentive compensation. The change in accruals has no significant 
association with compensation change, suggesting that accruals have no effect on 
evaluating a CEO’s performance. From both Table 8 and Table 9, it seems that firm 
performance (measured by accounting earnings or equity returns) is a determinant for 
CEO compensation. However, the explanatory power of each performance measure 
may change among the components of compensation package.   
As for other independent variables, the change in firm size positively affects the 
changes in CEO cash and total compensation but does not significantly influence the 
change in stock-based compensation. The change in CEO shareholding does not show 
any significant effect on the change in CEO compensation from 1999 to 2000. 
There is no significant relationship between the change in ESO and the change in 
CEO compensation from 1999 to 2000. Since ESO has no explanatory power for cash 
compensation in 2000 (the compensation level model), the effect of ESO on CEO 
compensation may be weakened when combining the data from both 1999 and 2000 
(the compensation change model). 
The change in R&D expenditures does not affect the change in CEO compensation. 
Therefore, there is no relationship between CEO compensation and R&D 
expenditures, consistent with the result from the compensation level model. 
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5.2.2 Compensation Level Model using Market-Adjusted Returns of Equity 
This model is different from the compensation level model in that it uses market 
adjusted returns of the equity instead of raw returns to investigate the factors for CEO 
cash compensation and CEO stock-based compensation. Table 10 and Table 11 
present the regression results for equations III (a) and III (b). The results of this model 
are similar to those of the compensation level model that uses raw equity returns as 
the firm performance measure.  
As for the firm performance variables, the market-adjusted equity returns affect CEO 
cash compensation in 1998. In the other years, CEO compensation is not significantly 
influenced by firm performance. Also, previous year’s performance does not show 
significant influence on CEO stock-based compensation. 
The positive effect of firm size on CEO compensation is still significant in this model. 
A firm’s growth opportunities mainly affect CEO stock-based compensation. CEO 
cash compensation is generally influenced by the CEO’s age, tenure and shareholding. 
Previous year’s cash compensation does not influence the current CEO cash 
compensation, while previous year’s stock-based compensation seems to have a 
positive effect on the current year’s stock-based compensation. 
Employee stock option costs exhibit a significantly negative relationship with CEO 
cash compensation for both 1998 and 1999. A negative relationship is also observed 
between employee stock option costs and CEO stock-based compensation for 1999 
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and 2000. R&D expenditures are not associated with either CEO cash compensation 
or stock-based compensation for most of the sample years. 
 
Table 10: CEO Cash Compensation Level Model 

































       
OCFTt -0.005  -0.09  0.023 0.59  0.093 1.36  
ACCRt -0.053  -0.87  0.051 1.35  0.008 0.13  
ARETt 0.290  3.34** 0.001 0.02  0.012 0.19  
MBV -0.047  -0.80  0.032 0.93  0.037 0.56  
SALESGTH -0.249  -2.85** -0.023 -0.60  -0.068 -0.90  
SIZEt 0.456  7.85** 0.758 23.23** 0.319 5.23** 
AGEt 0.198  3.00** 0.045 1.19  0.138 1.95* 
TENUREt 0.030  0.43  0.065 1.64*  0.198 2.68** 
CEOSHt -0.074  -1.10  -0.082 -2.25** -0.168 -2.46** 
CASHPAYt-1 -0.111  -1.85  -0.057 -1.50  -0.02 -0.28  
ESOt  -0.193  -1.98** -0.072 -1.64*  -0.032 -0.36  
RDt  0.025  0.25  0.007 0.16  -0.064 -0.81  
IND1 0.127  1.88*  0.033 0.89  -0.075 -1.15  
IND2 -0.004  -0.06  -0.035 -0.99  -0.015 -0.21  
IND3 -0.042  -0.64  -0.001 -0.02  -0.025 -0.31  
IND4 0.020  0.29  -0.021 -0.52  -0.014 -0.22  
IND5 -0.004  -0.07  0.041 1.22  -0.105 -1.43  
       
Sample Size 202  363  229  
R² (Adjusted) 0.442  0.655  0.219  
 
**  Significant at the level of 5% 
*   Significant at the level of 10% 
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Table 11: CEO Stock-based Compensation Level Model 







































       
OCFTt 0.055  0.59  -0.054  -0.65  0.006  0.07 
ACCRt -0.047  -0.60  -0.020  -0.32  -0.060  -0.85  
ARETt -0.173  -1.62  0.045  0.87  0.043  0.64 
MBV 0.132  1.83*  -0.007  -0.13  0.162  2.28** 
SALESGTH 0.225  2.05** 0.444  6.88** 0.174  2.14** 
SIZEt 0.304  4.30** 0.154  3.34** 0.111  1.74* 
AGEt 0.013  0.17  0.013  0.24  -0.085  -1.14  
TENUREt -0.064  -0.75  -0.094  -1.66*  -0.023  -0.30  
CEOSHt -0.002  -0.03  -0.045  -0.87  0.136  1.87* 
OCFTt-1 0.152  1.52  0.111  1.36  -0.017  -0.17  
ACCRt-1 -0.034  -0.37  -0.044  -0.78  -0.049  -0.63  
ARETt-1 -0.043  -0.60  -0.139  -2.40** -0.051  -0.63  
STKPAYt-1 -0.043  -0.60  0.484  8.10** 0.500  5.70** 
ESOt  0.131  1.09  -0.360  -4.85** -0.364  -3.10** 
RDt  -0.240  -1.86*  -0.096  -1.43  0.014  0.17 
IND1 0.108  1.31  0.077  1.45  0.062  0.82 
IND2 0.003  0.04  0.005  0.10  0.038  0.56 
IND3 0.039  0.48  0.011  0.20  0.032  0.43 
IND4 0.141  1.67*  0.037  0.64  0.057  0.68 
IND5 -0.040  -0.53  0.111  2.25** -0.029  -0.43  
       
Sample Size 202  363  229  
R² (Adjusted) 0.097  0.312  0.146  
 
**  Significant at the level of 5% 
*   Significant at the level of 10% 
 
 





6.1 Summary of the Study 
This study reexamines the determinants of CEO compensation with a major change in 
focus. I break down earnings into many elements and relate CEO compensation to 
each element rather than to total earnings, as has been the case in prior studies. 
Moreover, I emphasize the effects of employee stock options and R&D expenditures 
on CEO compensation because firm performance as measured by reported accounting 
profits could contain important errors if these two items are not carefully taken into 
account. The study advances knowledge on the relationship between CEO 
compensation and firm performance. The empirical relationships between CEO 
compensation and employee stock options as well as R&D expenditures may help 
inform how firms internally view these two controversial accounting items.  
As argued by Aboody et al. (2004), although GAAP do not require firms to expense 
the employee stock options, investors may view this item as an expense. Since the 
compensation committee represents the interests of shareholders, the committee may 
also view the employee stock options as an expense and penalize the CEO 
compensation for this item. Therefore, I predict that employee stock options 
negatively affect CEO compensation. By the same token, there will be a negative 
relationship between CEO compensation and R&D expenditures if R&D expenditures 
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are treated as a “real” expense. If no relationship is found between CEO compensation 
and R&D expenditures, one possible explanation is that this item is regarded as an 
asset and its future benefit is not fully captured by current performance measures.  
By annual cross-sectional regressions, I investigate the relationships between CEO 
annual compensation and various elements of reported annual earnings, as well as 
market-based and other measures of performance for a sample of U.S. listed firms in 
1998, 1999 and 2000. Employee stock option costs and R&D expenditures are entered 
into the regressions as two independent variables, so their effects on CEO annual 
compensation can be assessed while controlling for other earnings elements and 
market-based and other measures of firm performance, including cash flows, accruals, 
equity returns, firm size, price-to-book ratio, past sales growth, CEO age, CEO tenure 
and CEO shareholdings. 
I use several measures of CEO compensation: cash compensation, stock-based 
compensation and total compensation. The relationships between each compensation 
measure and the earnings elements, as well as market-based and other measures of 
performance in each sample year are examined individually.  
I obtain two major results. First, CEO compensation is negatively correlated with 
ESO costs. This result therefore suggests that firms treat employee stock options as an 
expense internally, although the result is open to other interpretations. I also find that 
CEO compensation does not have a significant relationship with R&D expenditures in 
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the current year. The result is consistent with the explanation that firms do not regard 
R&D expenditures as an expense but as an investment/asset. 
Firm performance is found to be an important determinant of CEO cash compensation, 
although the explanatory power of the performance measures tends to vary over time. 
CEO cash compensation is also determined by firm size, the CEO’s age, his tenure, 
and his shareholding. CEO stock-based compensation is mainly affected by the firm 
size, its growth opportunities, and the previous year’s stock-based compensation of 
the CEO.  
6.2 Limitations of the Study and Further Development 
The estimation procedure for the CEO compensation regression tests in this study is 
subject to three limitations. First, the limited number of years in the sample restricts 
the generalization of the findings on CEO compensation determinants. Second, it is 
possible that some potentially important omitted variables may confound the process 
of statistical inference. Finally, the industry classification (6 industry groups) in this 
study could be crude. This is due to the limitation of a small sample size. A finer 
categorization of industry groups (and a larger sample) may reduce the noise in the 
statistical inference process. 
This study can be extended in two respects. First, future studies should increase the 
sample period by including more recent data. Second, besides employee stock options 
and R&D expenditures, there exist other accounting items that are similarly 
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controversial in their nature and in the current accounting standards prescribed for 
them, such as goodwill, restructuring charges, and extraordinary items. The methods 
in this study can be applied to investigate their effects on CEO compensation and how 





1. Definition and Measures of Variables 
 
Variable Definition Measurement 
















Proxy for accounting performance, calculated as: 
(Operating cash flow – Non-cash extraordinary items 
and discontinued operations + R&D expenditures) / 
Total assets 
ACCR Total Accruals 
[Earnings from continuing operations – (Operating 
cash flow – Non-cash extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations)] / Total assets 
RET Annual Equity Returns 
The cumulative stock market return to shareholders 
over the 12 month period of the firm’s fiscal year, 
calculated as:  
(Stock price at the end of sample year + dividends 
over the year) / Stock price at the beginning of the 
same year 
MBV Market to Book Ratio 
Measure of growth or investment opportunities, 
calculated as: 
Market value of the firm / Book value of its equity  
SALESGTH Sales Growth  3-year least-squares growth rate of sales, used to measure firm’s growth opportunities 
SIZE Firm Size The sales of the fiscal year 
AGE CEO Age Age of CEO who was in office during the sample year 
TENURE CEO Tenure Number of years since the time of CEO appointment till the sample year 
CEOSH CEO Shareholding 
Shares owned by CEO / Total number of outstanding 
shares of the firm 
ESO Employee Stock Option Costs 
The fair market value of firm’s all award of 
stock-based compensation at the grant date, computed 
as: (Reported net income – Pro forma net income) / 
Total assets 
RD Annual R&D Expenditures Annual R&D expenditure / Total assets 
IND1~5 Industry Membership 






2. Multicollinearity Test for Compensation Level Model 
 
Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) are one measure that can be used to detect multicollinearity 
(condition indices are another). Variance inflation factors are a scaled version of the multiple 
correlation coefficient between one independent variable and the rest of the independent variables. 
A value greater than 10 is an indication of potential multicollinearity problems. 
 
2.1 CEO Compensation Level Model for 1998 
 
    









       





       
OCFTt 0.000 1.35 0.054 1.95 0.060 1.95 
ACCRt -0.050 1.20 -0.056 1.33 -0.058 1.31 
RETt 0.279** 2.55 -0.166 2.60 -0.107 2.59 
MBV -0.030 1.09 0.138** 1.10  0.127* 1.10 
SALESGTH -0.238** 2.54 0.221** 2.69 0.169 2.64 
SIZEt 0.457** 1.11 0.303** 1.11  0.359** 1.11 
AGEt 0.195 1.46 0.012 1.46 0.047 1.46 
TENUREt 0.023 1.65 -0.065 1.70 -0.058 1.70 
CEOSHt -0.093 1.53 -0.001 1.57 -0.020 1.56 
OCFTt-1 - - 0.161 1.14 0.131 2.24 
ACCRt-1 - - -0.026 2.24 -0.040 1.80 
RETt-1 - - -0.039 1.80 -0.037 1.14 
CASHPAYt-1 -0.106* 1.16 - - - - 
STKPAYt-1 - - -0.043 1.14 - - 
TTPAYt-1 - - - - -0.061 1.12 
ESOt  -0.205** 3.11 0.134 3.19 0.083 3.21 
RDt  0.035 3.24 -0.234 3.68 -0.116 3.68 
IND1 0.110 1.48 0.113 1.48 0.122 1.48 
IND2 -0.008 1.25 0.005 1.25 0.001 1.25 
IND3 -0.057 1.45 0.045 1.45 0.031 1.45 
IND4 0.012 1.48 0.145* 1.57  0.138* 1.57 
IND5 -0.003 1.27 -0.041 1.27 -0.041 1.27 
       
Sample Size 205  205  205  
R² (Adjusted) 0.385  0.100  0.132  
       
 
**  The coefficient is statistically significant at the level of 5% 




2.2 CEO Compensation Level Model for 1999 
 
    









       





       
OCFTt 0.061* 1.47 0.019 3.19 -0.005 3.15 
ACCRt 0.047 1.36 0.005 1.86 -0.019 1.84 
RETt 0.008 1.28 0.030 1.33  0.033 1.32 
MBV 0.028 1.17 0.015 1.24  0.004 1.23 
SALESGTH -0.021 1.42 0.454** 2.25  0.444** 2.24 
SIZEt 0.741** 1.07 0.155** 1.07  0.238** 1.07 
AGEt 0.049 1.47 -0.030 1.45 -0.019 1.45 
TENUREt 0.061 1.54 -0.102* 1.58 -0.086 1.57 
CEOSHt -0.095** 1.32 -0.029 1.36 -0.052 1.35 
OCFTt-1 - - 0.040 3.09  0.079 3.03 
ACCRt-1 - - -0.049 1.54 -0.022 1.52 
RETt-1 - - -0.126** 1.89 -0.125** 1.87 
CASHPAYt-1 -0.051 1.45 - - - - 
STKPAYt-1 - - 0.335** 1.62 - - 
TTPAYt-1 - - - -  0.268** 1.83 
ESOt  -0.087** 1.86 -0.213** 2.17 -0.217** 2.20 
RDt  -0.002 1.91 -0.136** 2.24 -0.108 2.38 
IND1 0.015 1.40 0.062 1.40  0.059 1.40 
IND2 -0.048 1.22 -0.003 1.22 -0.009 1.22 
IND3 -0.023 1.45 -0.003 1.49 -0.004 1.49 
IND4 -0.040 1.56 0.011 1.64  0.016 1.64 
IND5 0.001 1.13 0.132** 1.15  0.091* 1.20 
       
Sample Size 407  407  407  
R² (Adjusted) 0.623  0.251  0.220  
       
 
**  The coefficient is statistically significant at the level of 5% 




2.3 CEO Compensation Level Model for 2000 
 
    









       





       
OCFTt 0.097 1.37 0.01 1.98  0.040 1.96 
ACCRt 0.010 1.23 -0.06 1.31 -0.071 1.30 
RETt 0.006 1.24 0.041 1.21  0.057 1.19 
MBV 0.048 1.24 0.149** 1.31  0.143** 1.32 
SALESGTH -0.063 1.68 0.182** 1.77  0.179** 1.76 
SIZEt 0.318** 1.08 0.111* 1.07  0.139** 1.08 
AGEt 0.136* 1.50 -0.087 1.52 -0.075 1.52 
TENUREt 0.200** 1.66 -0.031 1.68 -0.023 1.68 
CEOSHt -0.188** 1.44 0.135* 1.48  0.121 1.44 
OCFTt-1 - - -0.005 2.59  0.007 2.62 
ACCRt-1 - - -0.04 1.62 -0.028 1.61 
RETt-1 - - -0.046 1.80 -0.036 1.75 
CASHPAYt-1 -0.105 1.6 - - - - 
STKPAYt-1 - - 0.499** 2.04 - - 
TTPAYt-1 - - - -  0.443** 2.10 
ESOt  -0.035 2.42 -0.366** 3.65 -0.325** 3.63 
RDt  -0.058 1.83 0.01 1.73 -0.058 1.71 
IND1 -0.033 1.47 0.065 1.48  0.061 1.48 
IND2 -0.076 1.25 0.038 1.25  0.037 1.25 
IND3 -0.021 1.42 0.032 1.45  0.046 1.48 
IND4 -0.030 1.85 0.057 1.84  0.072 1.83 
IND5 -0.024 1.17 -0.026 1.16 -0.044 1.20 
       
Sample Size 231  231  231  
R² (Adjusted) 0.215  0.139  0.111  
       
 
**  The coefficient is statistically significant at the level of 5% 




3. S&P 500 Index Prices 
(1997 - 2002) 
 
The following chart gives the prices of the S&P 500 Index for the last trading day of each month 
from 1997 to 2002. 
 
Month 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
       
1 786.16 980.28 1279.64 1394.46 1366.01 1130.2 
2 790.82 1049.34 1238.33 1366.42 1239.94 1106.73 
3 757.12 1101.75 1286.37 1498.58 1160.33 1147.39 
4 801.34 1111.75 1335.18 1452.43 1249.46 1076.92 
5 848.28 1090.82 1301.84 1420.6 1255.82 1067.14 
6 885.14 1133.84 1372.71 1454.6 1224.42 989.82 
7 954.29 1120.67 1328.72 1430.83 1211.23 911.62 
8 899.47 957.28 1320.41 1517.68 1133.58 916.07 
9 947.28 1017.01 1282.71 1436.51 1040.94 815.28 
10 914.62 1098.67 1362.93 1429.4 1059.78 885.76 
11 955.4 1163.63 1388.91 1314.95 1139.45 936.31 
12 970.43 1229.23 1469.25 1320.28 1148.08 879.82 
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